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WELCOME FROM THE EMC CHAIR 
 
Dr. Derek S. Reveron 
EMC Informationist Chair, U.S. Naval War College 
 
This third maritime-centric EMC Chair Symposium is a follow-up to the release of the 2015 “Cooperative 
Strategy for 21
st
 century Seapower.” The symposium will explore maritime strategy, concepts essential to 
implement the maritime strategy, and international reactions to it. Participants from DOD, academia, and 
the policy community will convene in Newport to discuss force development, maritime warfare, role of 
technology, and humanitarian assistance. The implications are important for understanding the types of 
missions combatant commanders will execute and the types of equipment and training the sea services 
must provide to support these missions. This symposium in part fulfills the mission of the EMC Chair to 
support the Navy’s efforts to develop thinking about maritime security. Additional materials can be found 
at www.usnwc.edu/derekreveron. 
In an effort to share expertise with the Fleet and national security community beyond this event, the 
succeeding pages contain the working papers participants prepared in advance of the symposium. The six 
panels are: 
 Panel 1: International Perspectives on Maritime Strategy 
The 2007 maritime strategy and its 2015 update stress the importance of partnering with 
navies around the world to provide maritime security. The 2015 revision of the Cooperative 
Strategy devotes an entire section to international partnerships because, “By expanding our 
network of allies and partners and improving our ability to operate alongside them, naval 
forces: foster the secure environment essential to an open economic system based on the free 
flow of goods, protect U.S. natural resources, promote stability, deter conflict, and respond to 
aggression.” The panel investigates this strategic approach to global maritime security, and 
discusses the effectiveness and limitations of the strategy. By bringing together international 
officers to reflect on the strategy and global role of the U.S. Navy, panelists will consider the 
challenges and opportunities for an internationalist maritime strategy. 
 Panel 2: Reflections on Maritime Strategy 
The panel will review how the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard refreshed the 2007 
Cooperative Strategy to keep pace with changing times. Panelists will explain the advantages 
and drawbacks to how the sea services make strategy, draw lessons from the making of the 
2007 maritime strategy, and furnish insight into how the services can execute the 2015 
strategy in contested surroundings in Eurasia. The panel will shed light on how the U.S. Navy 
in particular can revise organizational arrangements to put strategy in charge of programming 
and budgeting--and thus reconnect maritime strategy to larger national purposes. 
 Panel 3: Navy Force Development 
The 2015 maritime strategy calls for the Navy to possess a wide ranging set of capabilities 
including: all domain access, deterrence, sea control and power projection, and maritime 
security. Along with these capabilities, the updated strategy brings forward several concepts, 
which if implemented successfully, will enable the Navy to leverage partnerships with other 
services and countries, better prepare its people to implement the strategy in the future, and 
develop needed capabilities in the “electromagnetic-cyber” environment. This panel will offer 
perspectives on what force structure elements will be needed to achieve these objectives 
taking into account the growing threats around the world combined with budget realities. 
 Panel 4: New Perspectives on Maritime Strategy 
This panel will offer perspectives from young scholars to illustrate how strategic theory 
interacts with the 21st century’s challenges. Serving as a bridge between today’s strategy 
documents and the future, these scholars will offer new perspectives on maritime strategy.  
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 Panel 5: Maritime Warfare 
“A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower” declares that “the Sea Services operate 
in the world’s oceans to protect the homeland, build security globally, project power, and win 
decisively. This ability to maneuver globally on the seas and to prevent others from using the 
sea against our interests constitutes a strategic advantage for the United States.” Yet the 
ability to maneuver is increasingly challenged as adversaries employ anti-access/area-denial 
concepts and weapons against the U.S. and its partners. Consequently, new concepts are 
needed to employ naval forces in denied areas. The aim of this panel is to investigate how the 
sea services will operationalize the evolving concept of Joint Access and Maneuver in the 
Global Commons(JAM–GC). 
 Panel 6: Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief 
Humanitarian organizations, international agencies, and militaries increasingly find 
themselves faced with complex emergencies and natural disasters in urban settings. Future 
climate change projections place coastal mega-cities at even greater risk than they are today. 
The high population density and intricate physical infrastructures contained within urban 
environments present a multitude of challenges to civilian-military coordination efforts and 
can significantly hinder effective responses. The U.S. Armed Forces routinely supports the 
U.S. Agency for International Development in responding to major disasters overseas that 
threaten the safety and well-being of U.S. citizens, as well as those of other countries. 
America’s Sea Services possess a broad range of rapidly deployable capabilities that have 
proven critical to life-saving and relief efforts during complex crises, when other responding 
organizations’ capabilities have been exceeded or are unable to provide a comprehensive 
response given the magnitude of the disaster. This panel will explore the challenges that exist 
during urban emergencies and possible strategies, concepts, training opportunities, and 
organizational changes that the U.S. Sea Services can institute to improve the efficacy of 
civilian-military humanitarian responses in these environments.  
 
Events like these are possible through the generosity of the Naval War College Foundation, the hard 
work of our Protocol & Events Department, and the commitment to academic excellence by the 
Department of the Navy and the U.S. Naval War College. While the Naval War College provided the 
venue for these discussions, the views in this document are those of only the author and do not represent 
any official position. 
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KEYNOTE ADDRESS 
ADMIRAL BILL HALSEY AND THE UNANTICIPATED STRATEGY: THE SOUTH PACIFIC IN 
WORLD WAR II 
 
Dr. Thomas Hughes 
School of Advanced Air and Space Studies 
 
Before World War II, the United States Navy devoted decades of intellectual capital to War Plan Orange, 
its masterful imagining of a conflict with Japan. Most of what the Navy bought and much of what it 
thought from 1920 to 1940 was the product of this creativity. Orange was a staple of the curriculum at the 
Naval War College, and by 1941 virtually every flag officer eligible for command at sea was a graduate of 
the Newport school, bequeathing to an entire generation of admirals a sound sensibility of the strategy 
that guided the nation upon the vast maritime stage of the Pacific Ocean, so much so that Chester Nimitz 
spoke for many when he opined very little of the actual war surprised him, having had practiced it so 
often on the gaming board in Newport. 
The South Pacific Theater was the one great exception. Before the war, neither Japan nor the United 
States anticipated the scope of the fighting south of the equator. Japanese success in the war’s first 
months, however, created momentum sufficient to birth embryonic ambitions for Australia and New 
Zealand among Imperial officials—at the same time Allied supply lines from the United States to 
Australia became sacrosanct after the war in North Africa had cut Britain’s Mediterranean routes to her 
Oceanic commonwealths. Suddenly, sleepy South Pacific isles, heretofore known only to natives, 
whalers, and coconut planters, became important enough to spark some of the war’s most sustained and 
brutal combat in what strategists call meeting engagements—battles over areas with little intrinsic value 
but where opposing forces collide nevertheless. This development would have astounded any respectable 
pre-war strategist, in either Washington or Tokyo. 
From the fall of 1942 to the spring of 1944 most of the Pacific War’s fighting took place on, near, or 
above New Guinea and small South Pacific outcroppings. In the Solomon Islands, first on Guadalcanal, 
then at New Georgia, and finally along the west coast of Bougainville, the compact geographic tableau 
demanded triphibious operations, to use a phrase coined by Winston Churchill. Thoroughly integrated air, 
sea, and ground campaigns, amid some of the globe’s most demanding environmental circumstances, 
confronted officers of every service with a host of challenges not foreseen by Orange. How well they did, 
both individually and collectively, helped determine the outcome along that edge of the world. 
Bill Halsey assumed command of South Pacific forces on 18 October 1942, after Robert Ghormley 
had failed to rally sufficient morale to fuel the epic struggle for Guadalcanal, then in its tenth week. 
Within a week, he had committed the bulk of his sea power to the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands; within 
a fortnight, he had commandeered every available resource within a thousand miles to succor the First 
Marine Division defending Henderson Field; and within a month had won the Naval Battle of 
Guadalcanal, putting the crisis of Guadalcanal behind the Allies. 
That was but the start. With a pre-war career devoid of joint operational experience and training, 
ignorance of fellow officers wearing Army khaki or, in most instances, Marine fatigues, and with even 
less knowledge of Army, air forces, and Marine fighting ways, Halsey navigated command of a new kind 
of war. This was a process marked first by hesitation and mistake and later by increasing confidence of 
the kind history later bestowed upon him. Along the way, he and his command transcribed a steep 
learning curve across the meaty middle of the war, at a time when the basic outcome was in doubt. At the 
end of the line, in the spring of 1944 and with the Japanese bastion at Rabaul in effect the Allies’ largest 
prisoner of war camp for Japanese, the war’s winner and looser were clear, even as great questions of 
strategy and operations awaited the Central Pacific drive, the liberation of the Philippines, and a dozen 
other things. 
Across the entire period, War Plan Orange offered little direct guidance. But a generation of practice 
for a war that was foreseen in basic outline rendered Halsey and his many cohorts well equipped to adjust 
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when modification was necessary, to endure when endurance was right, and to distinguish between 
stubbornness and perseverance in ongoing military operations—surely among the trickiest of all strategic 
attributes. Any history of the any future would fairly brim with conceit, mistake, and imprudence, of 
course, but confront the future we must—knowing full well of the vanity of the enterprise, of the nature if 
not the specifics of blunders to come, and of the dangerous flirtation with folly. If predicting the future is 
a fool’s errand, the process of imagining it, shaping it, and inventing it yields to the strategist rich 
dividends in operational prowess, strategic acumen, political adroitness, and, most of all, mental agility. 
As Dwight Eisenhower once famously opined, “Plans are nothing. Planning is everything.” Without it, we 
have nothing, or maybe even less. 
5 
The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or  
position of the Department of the Navy, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. 
PANEL 1: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON MARITIME STRATEGY 
A COOPERATIVE STRATEGY FOR 21ST CENTURY SEAPOWER, AN INDIAN PERSPECTIVE 
 
ADM Nirma Verma, IN (Ret.) 
U.S. Naval War College 
 
Key documents released by the government of United States outlining its strategy and policy, like the 
National Security Strategy or single Service Strategies, as also specific Combatant Command Strategies 
are looked at with the greatest of attention by nations across the world. The intention being to see how the 
security challenges and the mitigating strategies enunciated in these documents mesh in with a nation’s 
own assessment. From the Indian perspective too, the U.S. National Security Strategy [NSS] (February 
2015), the Cooperative Strategy for 21
st
 Century Seapower [CS21] (March 2015) and the “Asia-Pacific 
Maritime Security Strategy” [APMSS] (July 2015), complemented by statements of senior DoD/U.S. 
Navy leadership during Senate hearings, or in the public domain, have been viewed in context of the 
Indian Navy’s own “Indian Maritime Security Strategy” released in in October 2015. 
 
The View from India 
With its unique maritime geography, India defines its primary area of maritime interest as extending from 
the choke points of Malacca, Sunda and Lombok straits in the East to the Bab-el-Mandeb and Hormuz in 
the West, including their littoral states, hugging the East coast of Africa and the Bay of Bengal littoral. 
The secondary area extends from the South and East China Seas, to the Mediterranean and the Southern 
Indian Ocean. 
Threats are assessed to emanate from traditional and non-traditional sources. The traditional sources 
refer to states with organized military capability and resources, which harbor adversarial posture and 
inimical intent towards India. The likely sources of traditional threat would be from states with a history 
of aggression against India, and those with continuing disputes or maintaining adversarial postures to 
India’s national interests. At the same time, in recent years there has been a steady rise in non-traditional 
threats, in occurrence and scale, with the lines at times getting blurred with traditional challenges. This is 
especially the case where non-traditional threats receive cooperation, support and sponsorship from 
traditional entities - most prominently ‘maritime terrorism’. Other non-traditional maritime security 
threats include piracy and armed robbery at sea, unregulated activities at sea like trafficking/smuggling, 
proliferation of private armed security in the maritime domain, Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated 
(IUU) fishing, and the impact of climate change and natural disasters. 
As to be expected, countering the traditional maritime threats will remain the raison d’etre of the 
Indian Navy, particularly the way it is structured, equipped, modernized, trained and deployed. 
Concurrently, India places utmost importance on its relations with its maritime neighbors based on mutual 
respect for international law and norms. 
Shaping a broader maritime environment to counter the flow of threats and challenges from one area 
to another requires inclusive and cooperative efforts between the nations concerned and their maritime 
forces. Hence of equal import are maritime engagements with extra-regional powers, more prominently 
the U.S., to shape the maritime environment to mitigate traditional concerns and address non-traditional 
threats for mutual benefit. India’s “Look East” policy, now transformed into the “Act East” policy, is 
another manifestation of this principle. 
 
The View Enunciated by the U.S. 
The demise of the Cold War and economic reforms in India in 1992 ushered in a new phase of bilateral 
relations that have since grown exponentially, and so reflected in the policy statements emanating from 
both sides. The relationship has bloomed irrespective of the party in power in India. Commencing with 
the “Next Steps in Strategic Partnership” in 2004, through which the United States and India agreed to 
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expand cooperation in three specific areas viz. civilian nuclear activities, civilian space programs and 
high-technology trade, the relationship has graduated to a robust mil-mil relationship with the two navies 
taking the lead. This was later followed by 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance that emphasized the long-term 
strategic partnership between the two countries. The maritime cooperation dimension is further embodied in 
the documents released in 2015. 
The 2015 NSS states that the two countries are primed to unlock the potential of the relationship. While 
stressing the need for collective action to address global risks, in the context of India it states – “We see a 
strategic convergence with India’s Act East policy and our continued implementation of the rebalance to 
Asia and the Pacific.” 
CS 21 (2015) issued following the ‘rebalance’ is a revision of CS 21 (2007). It is different in many ways 
as brought out in a study undertaken by India’s National Maritime Foundation. The revised version is more 
explicit in naming countries, either as adversaries, or allies and partners. It is also more forthcoming in 
articulating the ‘ways’ and ‘means’, to the extent it is possible in the public domain. Further, inclusion of a 
Preface by the Secretary of the Navy in the revised version is indicative of an enhanced political interface 
with the Sea Services. It therefore adds to the credibility that the new strategy, which includes platform 
numbers and their basing/deployment, is fiscally supportable. The strategy also addresses contemporary 
challenges of cyberspace operations, electromagnetic warfare and integrated fires. 
Of particular interest is that the major regions of the world have been addressed separately, and the 
articulation ‘Indo-Asia-Pacific’ is indicative of the Pacific and Indian Oceans being looked as a single 
entity. The emphasis on a ‘cooperative approach’ in addressing mutual maritime security challenges is 
showcased in referring to it as a ‘global network of navies’. The strength of the strategy is that there has to 
be only a willingness to cooperate; there is no commitment and a nation does not have to be part of an 
alliance. In the revised CS21, nations can ‘plug and play’ with U.S. forces based on their national interests. 
Most nations are hesitant to name adversaries and the revised CS 21 absolves them of this dilemma. It may 
be expected that regional navies would be more forthcoming in exercising with U.S. Navy, and in the 
process gradually build ‘interoperability’. However, it would certainly take a rather long time before partner 
navies can be integrated into a Carrier Strike Group or an Amphibious Ready Group; to that end the revised 
strategy is way too ambitious. At the same time, the revised strategy recommendation on promoting 
cooperation between the Coast Guards in the region is an attractive option as it signals a cooperative activity 
for delivery of public goods at sea. 
The release of the “Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy” seems to complete a full circle in 
designating the region, after it being articulated by turn as the ‘Indo-Pacific” and the CS21 nomenclature 
‘Indo-Asia-Pacific’. It is not that it is the result of de-hyphenation of the two oceans, as the document also 
addresses developments in the Indian Ocean. In fact it recommends a three-pronged approach to maritime 
cooperation with India: maintaining a shared vision on maritime security issues; upgrading the bilateral 
maritime security partnership; and collaborating to both build regional partnership capacity and improve 
regional maritime domain awareness. 
The document “A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority” issued by the current CNO of the U.S. 
Navy further reinforces the principle of maritime cooperation by calling for prioritizing key international 
partnerships through information sharing, interoperability initiatives, and combined operations. 
In sum, CS21 has a workable approach towards ushering in a global cooperative maritime security 
mechanism. However, there is a need to exercise patience and immediate results should not be expected. 
What is important is to move along the intended track. 
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PANEL 1: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON MARITIME STRATEGY 
WESTERN HEMISPHERE PERSPECTIVE ON MARITIME STRATEGY 
 
ADM Guillermo E. Barrera Hurtado, ARC (Ret.) 
U.S. Naval War College 
 
There are challenges and opportunities for an international strategy in the Western Hemisphere. The challenges 
in the hemisphere can be summarized as: Transnational Criminal Organizations (TOC), Illegal Trafficking, 
Terrorism/Gangs, and Instability in some countries.  
 
Challenges 
TOC are in some ways the result of a successful – but illegal – international business, known today as narco-
trafficking, and many multiple-related criminal activities. Perhaps their biggest advantage is that they use all of 
the instruments of power available to them in a comprehensive, coordinated and synchronized long-term 
strategy, without ethics or respect for human dignity. Their power is growing so much, that many times they 
are more powerful than law enforcement institutions and in some instances more powerful than nation-states. 
Illegal Trafficking includes that of humans, narcotics, weapons, money, and smuggling of goods. These 
illegal businesses are generating corruption, extortion via kidnapping and assassination, and in some cases 
reducing governability, as is the case in some countries in Central America. And once narco-traffickers acquire 
fully-submersible vehicles – which they will – only naval vessels equipped with submarine detection systems 
will be able to locate them. The connection between law enforcement and security will have to be stronger. 
Terrorism/Gangs: Colombia and Peru are still fighting terrorist organizations, but gangs continue to exert 
influence in Central America, Mexico, Brazil, and other countries in the region. 
Instability remains a problem in some countries of Central America which are transit countries for narco-
traffickers, and are also affected by TOC and Gangs. Another source of instability is illegal migrations, a 
lucrative business for TOC which creates refugees and illegal immigrants, not only from the south, but also 
from Africa and Asia, through South and Central American corridors. 
Many times, these illegal activities present threats to the security of countries, and in some cases, turn 
them into failing states. 
Another factor to consider is the fact that China is the first, second or third largest commercial partner to 
most of the countries in Latin America. For example, Brazil – the largest economy in South America, and 22
nd
 
largest in the world – shares 41.2% of its trade with China and only 26.7% with the U.S. 
Other challenges to cooperation at sea in the hemisphere there are three main tendencies: first, those that 
want to have cooperation in the hemisphere without the U.S.; second, those that want to have a good and 
healthy cooperation with the U.S. based on common challenges and opportunities as partners; and third, those 
that would like to have freedom of choice on whether or not to cooperate. Sovereignty, politics and ideologies 
play a large role in these matters. 
During the 2007 International Seapower Symposium (ISS-19), at which A Cooperative Strategy for 21
st
 
Century Seapower (CS-21) was introduced to 104 heads of maritime services around the world, the theme of 
narco-trafficking in the Americas was presented as a threat to the security of the states in the Americas. Chiefs 
of Coast Guards showed interest, but not Chiefs of navies. Since then, narco-trafficking has permeated deeply 
into countries of the region, affecting the stability and security of some. Since 2007, Brazil become the second-
largest consumer of cocaine in the world, and is a transit country for cocaine to West Africa. Mexico is now the 
largest producer of amphetamines in the world, and is the fourth-highest country in homicides per 100,000 
inhabitants, after Venezuela, Honduras and El Salvador; these two last countries are cocaine transit countries in 
the Central American Corridor. And with regard to cocaine-producing countries, Colombia, Peru and Bolivia 
remain the largest producers in the world. 
Opportunities for Cooperation  
Since the annual UNITAS exercise started in the 1950’s, the navies of the Americas have acquired concepts of 
interoperability that could be the basis for coalition operations at sea against the common challenges in the 
Western Hemisphere. After 2007, navies began to recognize that to differing degrees, TOC, narco-trafficking, 
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and terrorism/gangs, were affecting the stability and security of the region. Today, there is a recognition among 
navies of the serious threat of these challenges to the security and stability of their countries. Through their 
respective Congresses, the U.S., Brazil, Mexico, Peru and Colombia (to name a few) have made important 
changes to their laws, which have advanced legislation to empower the military to successfully combat the 
threats, both individually or in coordination with other agencies and countries. 
From the first to the last page, the 2015 “refresh” of CS-21 (referred to as CS-21R) refers to TOC, illegal 
trafficking, and terrorism/gangs – as opposed to the National Interests of the U.S. – and all have been declared 
matters of national security. Because all are common challenges for all countries in the Western Hemisphere, it 
is a logical starting point for successful cooperation. In accordance with CS-21R, three of the five essential 
functions of the maritime services are related to these challenges: Sea control, power projection and maritime 
security, and all domain access. But also, CS-21R stresses the idea that “naval forces are stronger when we 
operate jointly and together with allies and partners… working together in formal and informal networks, we 
can address the threats to our mutual maritime security interest.”
1
 
Section II of CS-21R specifically mentions the Western Hemisphere, and the need to “strengthen 
partnership and capacity … (in order) to protect the homeland and counter illicit trafficking and transnational 
criminal organizations … (and the three maritime services provide the means, training and engagement to) … 
increase interoperability with regional partners and strengthen their capacity to interdict transnational criminal 
organizations.”
2
 Some countries are already working in this direction with the U.S., particularly Canada, 
Mexico, Colombia, Peru and Chile, in support of Central American and Caribbean nations. Some regional 
initiatives are starting to flourish. 
Since the 1990s, and through bilateral agreements, maritime countries in the Western Hemisphere have 
acquired interdiction capabilities and capacities. The individual and bilateral efforts had been partially 
successful, but TOC, illegal trafficking and terrorists/gangs have not been defeated, and in some instances they 
had been very successful. Is this because of the lack of a “Western Hemisphere International and 
Comprehensive Strategy?” Perhaps it is time to speed up the tempo and be more effective in combating these 
threats, just as ADM John M. Richardson is proposing to the U.S. Navy: the continuous evaluation of the 
changing environment, and “designing” common objectives to be achieved in the short and medium term, 
which in turn is the basis to create the conditions for “working together.” 
In order to facilitate “working together,” the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic 
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, as well as the Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, and 
various Conventions on Terrorism (and other interrelated themes), are great frameworks to empower countries 
to create the legal structure for cooperation and partnership, because no one country acting alone can be 
successful. Countries can and need to help one another as each makes advances in the fight against these 
challenges. But the most important asset needed is the will of each country to work together. Not addressing 
and meeting the challenges to the region will continue to degrade the well-being of millions of human beings, 
as well as the loss of life. Therefore, countries cannot afford to wait for consensus to attack these threats. We 
need to find a starting point which at least some the nations of the regions can agree on. Once the train starts 
moving, other nations will jump on board. 
 
 What are the conditions that will facilitate the gathering of the capacities and capabilities of the 
countries of the Western Hemisphere to face the challenges outlined above? 
 What would an international maritime strategy to address these challenges look like? 
 What can be done in the short term to increase both maritime cooperation and interoperability 
successfully? 
 How do we overcome political and ideological differences in order to protect millions of human 
beings who are affected by the threats on a daily basis? 
 
                                                 
1 A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Sea Power, p. 2 
2 A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Sea Power, p. 18 
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PANEL 1: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON MARITIME STRATEGY 
AVOIDING THE DRAGON’S BREATH AND THE BEAR’S CLAWS 
 
RAdm Christopher Parry, CBE 
University of Reading 
 
In the 21
st
 century, the sea remains the pre-eminent medium of access and exchange. The two Eurasian, 
continental powers, Russia and China, have recognised that the sea, as the engine of globalisation, is vital 
to their ability to assert their status as great powers. They also are aware that the connections between the 
sources of raw materials, production centres and markets confer an ability both to exercise control of 
commerce and to offer the means by which further means of influence and coercion can be incorporated 
into their diplomacy. 
A recent speech by President Xi Jinping expresses these themes: 
 
We should realize that the 21st century is the century of the sea as people have entered 
into a period of nautical exploration. 
Explorations of the sea have paved the way for China's future development and it is part 
of China's strategic development that cannot be neglected. 
During the process of China developing into a maritime power, the world should join 
forces to safeguard maritime peace. If there is any maritime hegemonism, terrorism and 
piracy, the stability of the world's waters cannot be maintained. 
 
He concluded with the telling sentence, ‘The traditional mentality that land outweighs sea must 
be abandoned. 
As the strategic level, both Russia and China are challenging the current rules-based international 
system, with frequent statements about the need to ‘de-Americanise’ the world and its institutions. At sea, 
there have been regular attempts to test the limits of toleration in either eroding or overriding international 
or national entitlements, especially in relation to the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea. These 
contraventions are consistent with their stated desire to recover sovereign rights across several areas of 
strategic interest that they claim to have lost when agreements were negotiated when they were in a 
position of inferiority or weakness. This approach is also expressed as an aversion to the status quo and 
any cooperative agreement, when it does not suit their interests.  
As evidence of their re-discovered interest in the sea, Russia and China are both expanding and 
modernising their maritime forces to enable them to challenge the status quo at sea, notably with the 
introduction of anti-access and area denial platforms and systems. These are benchmarked against the 
capabilities of the naval forces of the free world and represent not only a considerable force-on-force 
threat, but also inflict a disadvantageous cost ratio on western country and their allies in seeking to defend 
against them. 
However, it is Russia and China’s apparent intention and increasing capability to use the sea to 
dominate and control their immediate neighbourhoods, in place of land-based interventions and 
immediate coercive pressure that needs to be noticed in the context of the early 21
st
 century. 
Russia is busily extending its reach and capability to dominate the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea and the 
Arctic, with the deployment of increasingly capable denial weapons and systems. Its occupation of 
Crimea has seen a significant re-fortification of the peninsula, characterised by increasingly capable anti-
surface and anti-air weapons, backed up by powerful aviation, surveillance and offshore zone patrol 
forces. A similar process is under way in the Baltic, with substantial enhancements to the Western 
Military District and the exclave of Kaliningrad, most notably the use of sophisticated anti-ship missiles 
and the S-400 anti-air system. The Arctic has also been significantly reinforced. 
10 
The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or  
position of the Department of the Navy, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. 
Meanwhile, it is evident that China has adopted a territorial approach to the South and East China 
Seas, with the overriding of the claims of its neighbours to economic zones, in gradually extending its 
grip out to its so-called 10-dash line. The systematic construction of infrastructure and military facilities, 
as well as the basing of combat aircraft and surveillance systems on the reefs of the Spratly and Paracel 
groups is evidence of a determined drive to assert sovereign right, enforced by might. 
These measures by China and Russia are not related simply to attempts to strengthen their relative 
advantage in times of tension and war, but in peacetime as well, with the implicit threat of coercion being 
conveyed to their neighbours. Russia and China appear to be applying anti-access and denial doctrine to 
routine peacetime activity, as well as their wartime planning. Strategically, if Russia and China can 
routinely exclude the U.S. and its allies from areas of sea (and the associated airspace) that represent their 
‘near abroad’ they will increase their ability to dominate their regions both commercially and 
strategically, while weakening the assurances and links between the U.S. and its major allies and treaty 
partners. This process would have an extremely damaging effect on U.S. assurances to Europe and 
NATO, on the one hand, and Japan and South Korea, as well as other Asia-Pacific partners that fear 
China’s domination, on the other. 
As such the issues at stake in the South and East China Seas represent a significant test case. If these 
disputes are not resolved peacefully, future naval conflicts in other parts of the world are likely to revolve 
around and result in a series of ‘land grabs’ at sea, just as land campaigns in the past were fought to 
acquire land and assets. However, as long as China and Russia have more to lose than to gain from a 
breakdown of the international system of law and trade, the current grudging acceptance of the status quo 
seems set to continue, punctuated by a sequence of minor spats and disputes in the margins of UNCLOS.  
Consequently, the first half of the 21st century in the region is likely to witness a series of tests of 
will and resolve as both the U.S. and its allies and China and Russia probe and assess each other’s 
responses to incidents on the ragged edge between ‘territorial’ claims and insistence on the freedom of 
the seas. Incidents are likely to take the form of ‘encounter actions’ between single vessels or small 
forces rather than substantial task groups. They are likely to involve the use of unmanned assets to probe 
the limits of tolerance. 
In the areas under threat, countries will probably have to decide on a case-by-case basis whether it is 
worth risking confrontation and conflict in order to preserve their offshore integrity and the freedom of 
the seas. Those that have a primary commercial partnership with either Russia or China and a primary 
strategic relationship with the U.S. will have a particularly difficult dilemma. Those that possess decisive 
military capability are likely to be able to threaten or use force to insist on their claimed rights or the 
maintenance of the status quo. Those that cannot deploy forces or call allies in aid will be forced to back 
down in the face of encroachment or exploitation. Unless the U.S. stands behind them, by speaking softly 
(or loudly) and carrying a big stick, the ‘Melian Dialogue’ from the Peloponnesian War will probably 
apply: ‘the strong do as they can and the weak suffer what they must’. 
The fundamental issue at stake is whether the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea will remain, by 
cooperation or enforcement, the basis for the international order at sea. At present, only the U.S. is 
prepared to challenge the blatant ‘land grab’ at sea by China and the various attempts at coercion by 
Russia. Unless the world community is prepared to accept a post-Grotian world in which the freedom of 
the seas gives way to controlled and exclusive sea-space, other countries will need to be prepared to assist 
the U.S. in its task of ensuring that the seas of the world remain open to all those who wish to proceed ‘on 
their lawful occasions.’ 
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PANEL 1: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON MARITIME STRATEGY 
RISKS, RHETORIC AND REALITY: UNITED STATES MARITIME STRATEGY 2015 AND BEYOND 
 
CDRE Lee Cordner, RAN (Ret.) 
The University of Adelaide 
 
‘A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower’ is a powerful declaratory statement in support of 
ongoing United States aspirations to remain the most significant global power. It endeavours to achieve 
this by asserting that the U.S. will maintain both the capacity and will to selectively dominate at and from 
the sea. The document is written in clear, simple language that emphasizes recurring themes. It addresses 
several audiences: the international community comprising allies and potential partners, and potential 
adversaries; internal to the United States, political, government, industry and Department of Defense; and 
internal to the U.S. ‘Sea Services.’ 
The Strategy could be re-named ‘A Hedging Strategy for 21st Century Seapower.’ It seeks to assure 
different audiences about the continued primacy of U.S. seapower in an uncertain global security context, 
a ‘turbulent world’ (p. 37), while advocating for domestic support and attempting to assuage everyone’s 
concerns. A range of factors are identified that could combine to put achievement of the maritime strategy 
‘at increased levels of risk’ in a climate of ‘fiscal austerity’ with a ‘smaller force’ and a reduced ‘footprint 
in some geographic regions’ while facing the possible threat of further ‘sequestration’ (p.27). This 
analysis of the latest ‘Cooperative Strategy’ briefly examines risks and vulnerabilities to delivering 
against the Strategy, principally from an ‘India-Asia-Pacific’ (I-A-P) perspective.  
The first major, overarching risk that the Strategy raises is that of unrequited expectations. 
Recognition of the ‘rising importance of the Indo-Asia-Pacific region’ and the intent to deal with 
‘A2/AD’ capabilities will be reassuring to regional allies and potential partners, and may deter potential 
adversaries (China). Rising uncertainties in the A-I-P, despite ongoing U.S. reassurances about ‘the 
Pivot’, mean that regional states feel compelled to adopt their own hedging strategies, which in turn 
contribute to rising regional tensions and regional security uncertainty. I-A-P regional states will continue 
to ask questions that impact regional security, for example, will the U.S.: 
 Be able to deliver given the dynamic global security risk context against a backdrop of U.S. 
fiscal and political uncertainty?  
 Have the capacity to address geographically disparate and increasing global security challenges?  
 Have the political will and acumen to apply effective maritime force in a complex, diverse and 
increasingly competitive international scene? 
A second major risk arises from continuation of the earlier ‘1000-ship navy’ theme, now described as 
an aspirational ‘global network of navies’ (pp. 1 & 3). While the rhetoric is heartening to ‘long-standing 
allies’ (p. 1) and perhaps to some potential partners in the A-I-P, the actuality of achieving this is 
challenging. Admiral Greenert’s glib statement that ‘All it takes is a willingness to cooperate… anyone 
can plug-and-play’ (p.5) trivialises practical factors including, for example: technological connectivity, 
protocols and information security; doctrinal and tactical incoherencies; equipment and logistic 
incompatibilities; language, ideological and cultural differences; and political factors. Very few navies 
have the capability to effectively ‘plug and play’ with the USN in a high-end warfighting context, while 
some others would be more interoperable with the U.S. Coast Guard. For countries that have formal 
security alliances with the U.S., like Thailand, cooperation can be significantly constrained by political 
factors; in this case the U.S. 1961 Foreign Assistance Act that restricts levels of military cooperation with 
countries under military control. Even when the national interests of nations that commit to maritime 
security operations significantly converge, for example, anti-piracy operations off the Horn of Africa, the 
real levels of cooperation with U.S. forces from many navies can be minimal. 
There is a greater risk that translates into a significant vulnerability arising from the ‘global network 
of navies’ concept. Countries like Australia, with formal U.S. alliances along with others are prone to 
constrain investment in naval capabilities based upon a premise that the U.S. will come to their assistance 
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if necessary. This may prove delusional if the U.S. is stretched and engaged elsewhere and if political 
realities prevail. Further, there is a collective security risk if the Strategy is to some extent reliant upon an 
unrealistic expectation that others will provide ready and capable forces to support the U.S., which could 
lead the U.S. government to invest less in maritime forces. A related risk is achieving high levels of mutual 
trust required for effective combined and joint operations inherent in ‘a deeper cooperative relationship 
with our allies and partners and a greater emphasis upon Joint Force interdependence’ (p. 8).  
A third risk in the Strategy concerns the numbers of platforms and capabilities of the U.S. Sea Services 
and the stretch challenges of attempting to deliver against multiple commitments, including potentially 
concurrent operations. The Strategy advises that there will be ‘more than 300 ships and a forward presence 
of about 120 ships by 2020’ (p. 9). It further advises that the I-A-P will have ‘approximately 60 percent of 
Navy ships and aircraft’ based in the region by 2020, which equates to around 72 platforms. Presence in 
the Middle East will increase ‘from 30 ships today to about 40 in 2020’ (p. 13): is the Middle East part of 
the I-AP? If so, that leaves around 30 platforms for the rest of the I-A-P and if not the combined 
commitment is around 110 of 120 forward deployed platforms globally. This leaves little to reassure ‘vital’ 
NATO and European allies (p.14), provide ‘naval presence in Africa with adaptive force packages’ (p.16), 
and to ‘strengthen partnerships and capacity in the Western Hemisphere’ (p.18). The U.S. Coast Guard will 
support the USN in meeting some of these commitments and the inherent flexibility, agility and readiness 
of U.S. Sea Forces (p. 28) will mitigate some of these risks. 
Fourthly, there is an operational achievability risk presented with priority placed upon the new 
‘essential function’ of ‘all domain access’ (pp. 19-22, 31-34) designed to counter the rising A2DA threat 
posed by China (and perhaps Russia, although not mentioned). In essence, this concept requires a 
combination of other ‘essential functions’ like sea control and power projection, including the ‘ability of a 
nation to apply all… of its elements of national power’ (p. 24). Joint Force interdependence with the U.S. 
Air Force and Army will be a vital factor, which is mentioned briefly in the Strategy (p. 28) although there 
is scant detail on how this component of the Strategy will be achieved.  
The final risk addressed here is funding and related U.S. political commitment. Fiscal concerns are 
highlighted in the Strategy (pp. 27 & 37). Implementing any strategy is heavily dependent upon access to 
resources; this will remain a critical vulnerability. Similarly, the U.S. polity with its peculiar checks and 
balances, including an impending Presidential election, presents both opportunities and uncertainties that 
could either enhance or reduce prospects of delivering against the Strategy. 
Although there are risks and vulnerabilities including others not addressed here, ‘A Cooperative 
Strategy for 21st Century Seapower’ is an important aspirational and declaratory statement of U.S. intent 
to remain the leading global maritime power. The Strategy sends a powerful message to its several 
audiences who will variously embrace, support and react. Achieving effective networks of navies is a vital 
aspect of the Strategy for the A-I-P region. It will require high levels of commitment by the U.S. and the 
region to deliver tangible regional security enhancements: the rhetoric and the reality will need to coincide. 
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PANEL 2: REFLECTIONS ON MARITIME STRATEGY 
REFLECTIONS ON THE 2007 MARITIME STRATEGY AND THE FUTURE OF MARITIME 
THINKING IN THE U.S. NAVY 
 
CAPT Peter D. Haynes, U.S. Navy 
U.S. Special Operations Command 
 
The 2007 Maritime Strategy is a bifurcated document, one that reveals tensions between its halves—the 
first of which provides the “why” (i.e., the purpose of U.S. maritime forces) and the second addresses 
“how” the strategy will be operationalized. Each represents a different strategic approach, only one of 
which can be seen in the 2015 version. 
The “why” represents the thinking of the CNO that commissioned it, Admiral Mike Mullen and his 
deputy CNO for Operations, Plans and Strategy, Vice Admiral John Morgan. In 2006, Mullen had come 
to the Naval War College and called for a new maritime strategy. “I am here to challenge you,” he noted, 
“First, to rid yourselves of the old notion—held by so many for so long—that maritime strategy exists 
solely to fight and win wars at sea, and the rest will take care of itself. In a globalized…world the rest 
matters a lot.” 
One would be hard pressed to find a comment by a CNO that was more damning of the Navy’s 
narrow worldview. To Mullen and Morgan, the Navy had for far too long understood its purpose in terms 
of warfighting. The Navy had embraced the battle-centric Mahan, and ignored the system-centric Mahan 
and, as a consequence, the Navy had neglected the full range of economic and political effects that 
American seapower can achieve, particularly in an era of globalization. 
Another consequence was that the Navy squandered opportunities to form meaningful arguments in 
relation to competing forms of U.S. military power—the Air Force and Army, who, unlike the U.S. 
maritime services, did not have a preeminent role in sustaining the U.S. political and economic system 
and underwriting the political, commercial, and security conditions necessary for the prosperity of the 
United States and its key partners. 
After all, a maritime strategy—in war or peace—has always been more directly concerned with the 
relationship between the state and global markets than those associated with land or air power, a statement 
as true of the Age of Sail as it is today. 
The “why” half acknowledged that a maritime strategy was well-suited to the interests of a state 
whose prosperity and security interests have always been linked to and depended upon the vitality of the 
world economy, and to the free markets, open societies, and democratic politics that have (so far) 
accompanied sustained economic success. 
If the first half promised a radical shift in the Navy’s strategic outlook, the second, more pragmatic 
“how” half promised the opposite. 
The “how” half represented the operationally inclined thinking of the new CNO, Admiral Gary 
Roughead, who fundamentally changed the section before signing the document. It reflected the 
limitations imposed by the need to find consensus between the Navy’s “maritime-systemic” admirals and 
the “warfighting” admirals, and the realities of rationalizing the Navy and Marine Corps in ways that 
would derive fiscal support, the most proven of which was to do so in terms of warfighting, which what 
the second half essentially did. 
In the end, Mullen and Morgan got their maritime strategy (or at least, in retrospect, a maritime 
strategic outlook), but how the 2007 Maritime Strategy would be implemented and resourced ultimately 
accorded more with the preferences of warfighters like Admiral John Nathman and Secretary of the Navy 
Donald Winter. 
By itself, the 2007 version implied that while the ends of U.S. naval strategy had changed 
fundamentally, with the adoption of the goal to protect and enable the system, the means would not be 
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altered—and those means were all about warfighting. Although the ways in which those means were to be 
used promised to change, there is little indication that they have. 
In what was a brilliant fusing by Bryan McGrath of the deeply held beliefs of the Navy’s two factions, 
the 2007 version was a hybrid strategy that essentially stated that the best way to protect and maintain the 
system was to focus on deterring great-power wars from starting in the first place, and then from escalating 
to the point where they threatened global stability or, in the case of the First World War, the system itself. 
The 2015 version aimed to redress the most noted faults of the 2007 version—the lack of detail of 
“how” the three services will be designed, organized, and employed, in which case it did in a thorough and 
pragmatic fashion. The new version framed the maritime services’ purpose on what Geoff Till calls “a 
more muscular emphasis” not on defending the system, but defending the nation. The “why” was in terms 
of operational-level requirements associated with the need for forward presence, access and cyber 
challenges, the pivot to East Asia, and the functions of deterrence, sea control, power projection, maritime 
security, and all-domain access. 
So, if one were looking for an expansion of maritime thought in the 2015 version, and, specifically, 
how U.S. maritime forces would enable the system and bring about the full range of economic and political 
effects that American seapower can achieve in war or peace, one would be disappointed. 
One might wonder if that absence and the 2015 version’s embracing of the 2007 version’s warfighting 
logic signals a return of maritime ideas to the margins of consideration, the victim of the latter’s inability to 
secure the funds for a large, globally deployed fleet. 
If the 2007 version argues that the purpose of the U.S. maritime services should not be seen in terms of 
the threats to the United States, but in light of the relationship between the United States and its system, 
then the maritime services, with the 2015 version, seem poised to argue the opposite, and with it, 
presumably, the assumption that “the rest will take care of itself.” 
If one has doubts as to the future of maritime—as opposed to naval—thinking in the Navy, Jim 
Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara remind us that one should have no such doubts on the part of the world’s most 
avid students of Mahan—the Chinese, who are, at this minute, exploring how to derive the full range of 
economic and political effects that Chinese seapower can achieve in war, peace, and the widening and no-
less consequential space between war and peace. 
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PANEL 2: REFLECTIONS ON MARITIME STRATEGY 
DEVELOPING MARITIME STRATEGY 
 
Mr. Bryan McGrath 
The FerryBridge Group 
 
John Maynard Keynes is often quoted as saying something to the effect of “When the facts change, I 
change my opinion. What do you do, Sir?” It is unclear whether Keynes actually uttered these words, but 
they serve as a reasonable starting point for my role on this panel. 
In December of 2009, it occurred to me that the facts had indeed changed, the facts associated with and 
accounted for in the 2007 Maritime Strategy, with which I was generally associated as team lead and lead 
author. Consequently, I took to the blogosphere to describe how my opinion had changed in a piece on 
Information Dissemination entitled “Scrap the Maritime Strategy?” . In it and subsequent exchanges 
elsewhere, I made the case that the financial crisis that hit a year after the Maritime Strategy was released--
along with China’s increasingly more aggressive stance in the South China Sea and Russia’s aggression in 
Georgia—had created a set of circumstances in which the fundamental assumptions underpinning the 
strategy were now overcome by events. Believing as I did from the beginning, that the strategy should be 
periodically reviewed and updated, I felt the time was ripe to do so. 
I continued to maintain this position over the course of the next two years, and to it, I added a few 
additional considerations also born of events. First, I believed that we were entering a new era of great 
power contention, and that the country generally and the Navy specifically, needed to recognize this—
strategically. Second, the notion of a more integrated version of American Seapower began to arise, in no 
small measure from the Marine Corps concept of “Single Naval Battle”, which seems to have been 
consigned to ash heap of history, but which I believed was a superb notion for the provision of economical 
and efficient conventional deterrence forces throughout much of the world that mattered to us.  
In the fall of 2011, a newly announced CNO—Admiral Greenert—asked me to brief his transition 
team on two specific items. The first was process. He wanted me to go over how we organized and staffed 
for success in 2007, and what some of the challenges were. Secondly, he asked me to opine on how the 
2007 document should change to reflect the new strategic environment. It was this second tasking that I 
relished, and here are the main points of what I told them: 
 The new document should explain why we need a strong, globally deployed Navy, and it should 
clearly identify the threats to our nation that such a Navy mitigates.  
 After clearly identifying the threats, it should clearly articulate how it will respond.  
 It should return to a three-hub construct (Mediterranean/Europe, Arabian Gulf/Indian Ocean, 
Western Pacific) 
 It should reference a classified companion document.  
 It should embrace true integration between the Navy and the Marine Corps, not cooperation, nor 
coordination, nor interoperability, but true integration.  
 It should make a coherent argument for supporting an industrial base sufficient not only for 
present needs but also for potential expansion.  
I concluded that presentation with the following words: “The framers of the updated Maritime 
Strategy have a unique opportunity, and that is the chance to influence Obama Administration thinking 
going into an election year. To that end, the document should be more specific, less aspirational and 
narrative-based, and more hard-edged than its predecessor. Such an approach would create a coherent 
strategic predicate for shifting resources within the Department of Defense to adequately fund required 
naval capability and capacity.” 
Much to my chagrin and the disappointment of many others, the “refresh” of the 2007 strategy—which 
I called for in December 2009 and which was discussed in detail in the fall 2011 CNO Transition Team—
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did not appear until the beginning of last year (2015). Its development process bore little resemblance to 
the 2007 effort which, while I considered it to be cumbersome and bureaucratic at times, moved along 
with alacrity when compared to the 2015 version. Additionally, the time it took to get the document out 
resulted in team turnover, and the many iterations of the document showed consistent inconsistency of 
authorship. Along the way, I was asked at various times to provide my input—as were a number of 
others in this room.  
When the document emerged, my friend and colleague Bryan Clark and I put out our thoughts in a 
post at War on the Rocks. The main points we made were the following: 
 The strategy does not sufficiently explain the role and application of American Seapower in 
an era of increasing great power competition. 
 The strategy establishes “all domain access” as a new function for the maritime services and 
suggests it is their most important contribution to joint warfare, but the position of all domain 
access in the strategy’s functional hierarchy is not clear. 
 The new strategy does not address is the need for a robust naval and maritime industrial base. 
 
 
What have I learned now from nearly eight years of working closely on Maritime Strategy, both as a 
maker of it and as a critic? 
 CNO Level interest and involvement is key. We had it in 2007, they did not in 2015. 
 Make a plan, set milestones, meet them.  
 Maritime Strategy must not only describe what is, it should describe what could be. It should 
not be afraid to put upward pressure on national policy.  
 Maritime Strategy must not be deaf to Joint capabilities, but its job is not to shill for them. 
Maritime Strategy must describe the benefits conferred by Seapower. 
 We have missed opportunities in two straight maritime strategies to make the case for a 
viable naval industrial base, and this is unfortunate. At the level of true strategy, there is little 
more important. 
I believe the 2015 strategy was a solid effort, but my support for it has diminished since its release. At 
the very least, the Department of the Navy should immediately begin to work on a classified strategy for 
American Seapower in an age of great power contention. We are well aware of what the table stakes are 
for great power dynamics, yet we seem unprepared to prepare for them. Some of this may be political, a 
sense of not wishing to get in front of civilian leadership. But it is within the civilian leadership that these 
ideas must take hold if effective strategy is to influence acquisition, planning, and operations. 
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PANEL 2: REFLECTIONS ON MARITIME STRATEGY 
A FLEET PERSPECTIVE ON THE MARITIME STRATEGY 
 
CDR Andrea H. Cameron, U.S. Navy 
U.S. Naval War College 
 
One of the key benefits of the strategy was the deliberate, more specific integration of the sea services in 
this document. Throughout the three years of staffing, the document had been thoroughly processed 
through the bureaucracy that there is not much in it to object to on its face. The exercise of staffing the 
strategy is team-building in itself and the promulgation of it gives that more unified perspective to the 
members of the sea services. It connected the high end of the conflict spectrum activities of the USN and 
USMC to the low end and constabulary missions of the USCG. Further, the return to a more threat-based 
vision reflects the worse-case scenario business that we are in. Overall, the strategy was perceived as an 
improvement over the 2007 strategy. 
 
Content 
With respect to the content of the strategy, there were changes that caught attention. First and foremost, 
the strategy is one of total access with the primary objective being the ability to go anywhere and do 
anything. This is not new necessarily, it replaced “full spectrum dominance” in the 1990s. Not only was 
all domain access newly identified, it was listed first among the five functions, appearing to rank over and 
above the standard naval functions of deterrence, sea control, power projection, and maritime security. 
One could even see all-domain access as a derivative of the historic functions of sea control or power 
projection without a need for calling it out specifically. The appearance of preeminence reflects the more 
threat-based thinking rather than the more systemic approach embedded in the 2007 strategy.  
Second, one could ask: what happened to the systemic approach of the 2007 strategy?  In this strategy 
the Navy played a much broader with protecting the liberal world order, guarding the global sea-based 
trading system, and utilizing the hard power assets to show both hard and soft power effects. In fact, the 
inclusion of humanitarian assistance/disaster relief in 2007 marked a strategic shift showing that military 
assets for soft power missions could produce strategically superior outcomes. The loss of this perspective 
questions whether the strategy is actually strategic enough. And while it may play better in Congress who 
funds the services, its threat-based approach simultaneously sends messages of reassurance and concern 
rippling throughout the world.  
One final comment on content, this strategy focuses on state and non-state actors as threats. The 
potential threats to the future world include a variety of other concerns like climate change, population 
migration, urbanization, pandemics, transnational crime, and resource competition. One major criticism is 
what cannot be said in an unclassified document regarding regional assessments and capability 
development. While this is managed through classified addendums, it is not broadly available information 
to the fleet and leaves large gaps in overall understanding of what it might mean to them operationally, 
tactically, or personally. 
If the national strategy remains sustaining the world order, then inevitably, the military will play some 
role as an instrument of national power in addressing these concerns. This new strategy does little to plan 
for these inevitable events. 
 
Operational Support 
I do not do the fleet justice without mentioning the connection of the “we can do it all” strategy with the 
operational tempo that rides on the back of the ships and Sailors. Using data from the CNO’s 2016 
Posture Statement to Congress, since 2013, eight carrier strike groups, four amphibious readiness groups, 
and twelve destroyers have deployed for eight months or longer. The escalation of optempo, complexity 
of missions, and unpredictability of funding wreaks havoc among readiness, morale, maintenance, and 
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modernization. To quote the CNO: “the gap between our responsibilities and our funding levels represents 
risk -- risk of Sailors’ lives lost, of a weakened deterrent, of a slower response to crisis or conflict, of greater 
financial cost, of uncertainty for our international partners -- all of which affect the security and prosperity 
of America.” The strategy is challenging to fulfill operationally.  
The Navy is struggling to balance the requirements placed upon it with the resources (platforms, 
personnel, funding) available to complete the mission. The Navy has made operational changes trying to 
accommodate requirements of the strategy and the nation, but perhaps not meet them all. One example is 
shifting from a combatant command (CCMD) demand driven model for assets to a supply driven 
availability model. This causes friction between the CCMDs and the naval service and leaves gaps in carrier 
strike group availability that will need to be covered by the joint services. To date, this change has been 
reinforced with the support of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Along with this is the revised Optimized Fleet 
Response Plan (OFRP). This three-year cycle ties the ships in the carrier strike groups together for 
scheduling, maintenance, training, and deployments. This more predictable schedule is to maximize the 
employability of available force capacity and keeps ships just returned from deployment in a surge capacity 
during a post-deployment sustainment phase. The benefits include predictable scheduling, synchronization 
of modernization efforts within the strike group, and strike group cohesion, but it also has its drawbacks. It 
creates peaks and valleys for maintenance and training facilities, which may not be supportable. Equally 
important, the revised ship schedule does not match up with the aviation schedule of the carrier air wings. 
The post-deployment sustainment phase is largely unfunded—meaning squadrons lose their flight 
qualifications and even if the ship is ready to surge, its ability to be fully operational degrades significantly 
within months of returning from deployment. For the foreseeable future the air wings and the strike groups 
will not be able to maintain the same schedule. While the OFRP is a significant step forward in balancing 
the operational needs of the CCMDs with the long term sustainability of the Naval force, the full feasibility 
of it remains to be seen.  
Considering this information, does the new operational structure support the overall strategy?  One thing 
in its favor is that something is finally being done to try to address the phenomenal operational tempo 
stressing the fleet. However, the foundation of forward presence in the strategy is about giving more options 
to the President in times of crisis and the operational structure of the new system may limit the options.  
 
Endurability 
The sign of a good strategy is the endurability of it. In favor of the threat-based approach, the strategy 
remains valid until the threats change. However, it overlooks several other factors that could potentially 
impact the long-term usefulness of the strategy. Internal to the force, the ways and means, operational 
concepts, priorities, or force structure, will all play a role in the ongoing validity. Also, listing ship counts 
was a controversial addition to the strategy. While it sets a benchmark, it is something that challenges the 
endurability of the strategy. Externally, the strategy can be upended with political turnover, differences with 
higher leadership within the DoD, budget cuts, programming, and acquisition. Things are changing fast in 
the domestic and global environment and it is very possible that the sea services will have to write another 
strategy sooner than later. 
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PANEL 2: REFLECTIONS ON MARITIME STRATEGY 
REFLECTIONS ON U.S. NAVAL STRATEGY BEFORE 2007  
 
Mr. Peter M. Swartz 
CNA 
 
In 2005, newly-installed CNO Admiral Mike Mullen charged his Deputy Chief of Naval Operations with 
coming up with a new “maritime strategy.” The result, after two years of intensive and multi-faceted 
activity, was an unclassified public document -- A Cooperative Strategy for 21
st
 Century Seapower -- 
published in October 2007. In 2011, newly-installed CNO Admiral Jon Greenert called for a “refresh” of 
that document, and the result was a new unclassified edition subtitled “Forward, Engaged, and Ready,” 
published one year ago. These documents will be discussed by my colleagues on this panel, and hopefully 
by many of you.  
But where did the idea that the Navy needed such a “strategy” come from? And what issues were 
raised in the past that can shed light on recent and future efforts to develop naval or maritime strategy? 
That’s what I’m going to discuss, by giving a few examples. (For more detail, see 
www.cna.org/research/capstone-strategy-series.) 
Modern efforts to codify U.S. naval strategic thinking started in 1970, with a classified document 
drawn up by CNO Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, Jr. His Project SIXTY posited—and prioritized—four kinds of 
capabilities of the Navy, later described and popularized by Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner as four 
“missions:” “strategic deterrence,” “sea control,” “projection of power ashore,” and “naval presence.” The 
Zumwalt-Turner thesis was that the Navy was coming off an era that had favored power projection (e.g., 
against North Vietnam) and had entered one that required more emphasis on sea control, given a rapidly 
building global Soviet naval challenge.  
Zumwalt also introduced the discussion of presence as a major U.S. naval capability: in part because 
that was what the Navy actually delivered that was useful to the nation in the absence of war, and in part 
because he sought the defense establishment to recognize that and provide the Navy with earmarked 
resources to carry it out. (In this, he and his successors would be disappointed for 20 years). Zumwalt 
also, given post-Vietnam War U.S. defense budget cuts, strove to develop what he called an appropriate 
“hi-low mix” of platforms and weapons systems; supplementing the few, the complex and the expensive 
with the many, the simple, and the cheap. You will doubtless note that these same themes have pre-
occupied U.S. naval strategists and policy-makers since, and still do today. 
Zumwalt’s successor, Admiral James Holloway, did not find this construct useful, however, and 
modified it significantly in a Naval Warfare Publication called Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy. An 
ardent proponent of naval power projection and super-carriers, Holloway had the disagreeable job of 
serving as CNO during the Carter Administration, which, apart from nuclear deterrence, viewed convoy 
escort as the Navy’s only useful wartime mission, and lacked appreciation of what carriers and other 
Navy platforms might achieve to deter or fight in a NATO-Warsaw Pact war. 
A number of Navy efforts then ensued in the late 1970s to argue and demonstrate the virtues of the 
Navy and its carriers in such a war, culminating in the initial formulations of The Maritime Strategy in 
1981. That strategy was at once global, forward, offensive, allied and joint, and favored high-end 
platforms and weapons needed—for sea control as well as power projection—to go up against the 
powerful Soviets close to their own shores. The Maritime Strategy resonated well with many in the Fleet, 
and most importantly nested comfortably within the defense policies and strategy of the Reagan 
Administration and its strategy-minded Secretary of the Navy, John Lehman. The Maritime Strategy was 
conceptualized by the Navy staff’s trained and experienced strategy specialists, using guidance from on 
high and their own understanding of the role of naval strategy and policy and national security. It was 
then drafted, vetted, promulgated, critiqued, updated and implemented – through fleet exercises, war 
games, conferences, articles, speeches, CNO Strategic Study Group activities, and advanced fleet training 
like “Top Gun” and “Strike U.” From 1982 on, it also provided the framework for the Navy’s annual 
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internal warfare assessment process for developing the service’s program and budget proposals. Some 
editions were classified and detailed, for internal Navy use; some were more general and unclassified, for 
public explanation. The Soviets countered with a massive campaign to constrain the U.S. Navy through 
arms control initiatives, and the later years of the 1980s saw successive CNOs develop strategies to deal 
with this intense diplomatic offensive. 
But then the Soviets went away. And the Navy developed a plethora of successive – and sometimes 
simultaneous – ideas and documents to try to capture the essence of the Navy’s role in the murky post-
Cold War environment, and the proper mix among naval capabilities and missions, and “high” and “low” 
platforms and weapons. One milestone was Secretary of Defense Les Aspin’s Bottom Up Review of 1993, 
which allowed the Navy for the first time to justify its budget in part by its peacetime presence activities. 
The Zumwalt-Turner vision was finally achieved. One result was the provision of funding for an 
additional carrier battle group in the next defense budget. Another was the promulgation of yet another 
Navy strategy document: Forward . . . From the Sea, by CNO ADM Mike Boorda in 1994. But dollars for 
presence could also mean robbing Peter – cutting-edge U.S. Navy power projection and/or sea control 
capabilities – to pay Paul –combatant commander demands for increased forward naval presence, 
surveillance, and traditional strike operations. This issue is also salient today.  
 
Boorda’s immediate successors promulgated Navy “capstone” documents as well, all seeking to refine the 
balance among these issues, as well as addressing the now increasingly conspicuous views of the U.S. 
Marine Corps, in the face of an evolving post-Cold War environment. That environment included rapid 
globalization, unconventional threats abroad, changing American public attitudes, and a federal budget 
climate uncongenial to significant fleet growth. Before being named CNO, while serving as NATO’s 
Allied Joint Force Commander in Naples, Admiral Mullen realized that the Navy had to adopt – and 
disseminate -- a new strategic approach, not based on power projection as had been the case throughout 
the 1990s, but a broader approach that appreciated America’s changing role in the world and the unique 
and vital contributions of the U.S. maritime services—Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard. From that 
realization came the effort to create A Cooperative Strategy for 21
st
 Century Seapower. 
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PANEL 3: NAVY FORCE DEVELOPMENT 
TAILORING A NAVAL FORCE STRUCTURE TO THE EMERGING FUTURE SECURITY 
ENVIRONMENT  
 
Dr. Henry Hendrix II 
Center for a New American Security 
 
The panorama of history is replete with numerous great powers rising, making their mark upon the world 
and then declining in the face of another rising power. The Egyptians gave way to the Assyrians, and the 
Assyrians to the Babylonians etc. until the present day when the British Empire gave way to the Soviet 
and American Cold War and ultimately to a moment of American uni-polarity unlike any other era in 
history with the possible exception of the Romans. These cycles are well understood by those who 
choose to look at them, but what is not understood is the technologies that lay behind these rise and fall 
cycles throughout history. 
Great powers tend to rise and persist due to a set of advantages. These might be a an aspect of 
agrarian reform, or perhaps a system of governance that allows a great accrual of wealth, but rises are 
almost always accompanied by a particular form of military technology that provides an advantage to the 
nation who wields in upon the field of battle. The spear gave way to the bow and arrow. This 
combination gave way to a bowman on a horse in mounted cavalry formations. The phalanx made its 
debut and then was bested by the maniple formation. The longbow overcame French armor at Agincourt. 
Sailing ships of the line gave way to steam and steel. Technology marches inexorably on, except where it 
doesn’t, which is often in the great power that was responsible for introducing it. 
Great powers who rise on a new technology are become beholden to it, often beyond its useful life. 
Because new innovations come with a cost, be it economic or cultural, once a great power buys into a 
new form of military technology, it becomes a sunk cost. Innovation would of necessity require 
acknowledging that previous technologies had become obsolete and a decision to move in a new 
direction. History suggests that such acts of agility rarely occure. What is more likely is that a Great 
Power, having ridden a new technology to the top, will commit to that technology, perhaps even 
expanding its investment in it. This has the effect of presenting a stable capabilities target for other 
would be rising powers, allowing them to tailor a new capability that is focused on weaknesses inherit in 
the current Great Power’s military capability, allowing the rising power to ultimately surpass the 
reigning hegemon. 
We see that today across all four of our DoD services. The Army and Air Force each continue to 
invest in weapons that are evolutionary derivatives of platforms their predecessors in World War II 
operated despite seven decades of technological progress. The Navy with its ten carrier strike group 
awaiting orders to proceed to Point Luck prepares to fight the battle of Midway over again. The Marine 
Corps, which gained a congressional mandate codified in law, maintains a “fleet marine force,” prepared 
to perform an amphibious assault, with all the equipment necessary to perform that mission, despite the 
fact that the mission has not been executed 65 years. In each of these cases, the United States military 
has presented a stable target, evolving but not really changing, for rising powers to target. 
The Army has increasingly packed more soldiers into tanks, armored personnel carriers, and 
Humvees. Their enemy adapted armor piercing technologies and asymmetric tactics to kill and disable 
Americans in their mobile formations. The Air Force found itself facing radars and missiles with 
increasing range, maneuverability and lethality and responded by building a series of fighters and 
bombers that were both increasingly difficult to find and increasingly expense to buy, necessitating a 
decreasing force size that is unable to guarantee either air superiority or access to critical targets. The 
Navy and Marine Corps similarly have invested in progressively more capable platforms that come with 
added costs leading to a shrinking fleet and force even as the rest of the world invests in anti-access/area 
denial weapons designed to hold American naval power projection off beyond its effective range. With 
its inability to change, the American military has elected obsolescence. 
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“So what are we to do?” service proponents might ask. Change is the answer. Divorcement from the 
present reality, standing outside of the accepted paradigm and investing in change. 
Recognize that in peace we do not need all high end capabilities to demonstrate American interest and 
resolve. As the 2007 Cooperative Strategy for 21
st
 Century Seapower said, maintaining peace is at least as 
important as winning the war. A large number of low capability frigates, perhaps 75-100 of them, are 
required to service the 19 critical maritime regions of the globe. These frigates can provide maritime 
security, build partnership capacity, and demonstrate the United States’ resolve. Critics might say that these 
vessels would serve little to no role in a region spanning maritime war, such as that which was fought in 
the Pacific during the 1941-45 era, and they would be correct. That is not the war we should fight. 
If the United States were to go to war again it must leverage the technologies it has, a superb 
intelligence-reconnaissance complex as well as a precision strike capability unlike any other nation on 
earth, and combine these with newly emerging capabilities; unmanned and man-machine platforms, 
directed energy weapons, electro-magnetic and hypersonics to identify, target and destroy the critical center 
of gravity within the enemy camp. We should banish plans for a long campaign, attriting our way through 
the enemy’s military, population, infrastructure and essential systems to reach the one that really matters, 
its leadership. Should diplomacy and negotiations fail and circumstances warrant, then attacks on national 
leadership at hypersonic velocities should be the American way of war. 
Such attacks should come from increased numbers of nuclear submarines, perhaps a combination of 
100 fast attack and guided missile submarines, as well as hypersonic cruise missile laden long range strike 
bombers, and perhaps even from the decks of aircraft carriers, provided they rapidly integrate a long 
ranged, unmanned strike aircraft, capable of spanning the 1500 mile standoff range imposed by recent 
A2AD weapons. 
If the United States does not break with its past and sunk infrastructure force constructs, it condemns 
itself to a fate as a declining power. If, however, it embraces innovation, either under the label of a Third 
Offset, or Air-Sea Battle or some other convenient bumper sticker, then it has a chance to revitalize its 
leadership in the world and once again return to a position wherein it imposes costs upon its enemies, and 
not the other way around. Such innovation requires bold leadership and clear vision, characteristics our 
Navy once had in abundance and which I hope it still does. 
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FIVE COSTS OF MILITARY INNOVATION  
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Over the past year, the U.S. Department of Defense has engaged in an effort to reinvigorate the aging and 
exhausted U.S. military by reassessing and reforming its strategic and tactical priorities. These reforms 
are far-reaching in nature, ranging from the strategic pivot to Asia, to personnel reforms aimed at creating 
a more adaptive “force of the future,” to investments in new, high-tech war-fighting platforms. A key 
piece in this suite of changes, and the most significant from an operational standpoint, is DoD’s “third 
offset strategy” — an initiative aimed in part at countering new anti-access area-denial (A2AD) 
capabilities with a range of new technologies. And as the recent FY2017 budget rollout has illustrated, 
this reform effort is starting to take shape. 
The announcement of the third offset strategy has attracted much attention from within the defense 
policy community, and has been heralded by many as necessary for the United States to maintain its 
technological edge. And these efforts will no doubt result in significant benefits for the U.S. military. But 
this emphasis on innovation is not without its risks, many of which might be overlooked, underestimated, 
or even ignored in the excitement of a new defense initiative. Indeed, the tendency to equate technological 
innovation with positive change — perhaps the result of publicized successes in the private sector — often 
misses the myriad costs and challenges that accompany major overhauls of the kind announced by DoD. 
A number of recent articles in WOTR’s Beyond Offset series have turned to U.S. history to highlight 
some of the costs that accompanied previous offset strategies, and the challenges that might flow from 
today’s efforts. In addition to revisiting these specific experiences, it may also be beneficial to take a step 
back to map the landscape more broadly. This article aims to infuse the conversation about military 
innovation with a realistic sense of the potential pitfalls to this endeavor, so these challenges can be better 
understood, anticipated, and corrected as the United States develops its future force. Here we identify five 
major costs to innovation that are important to acknowledge: 
 
1. Effectiveness 
Too often overlooked in conversations about innovation, both in the military and elsewhere, is the natural, 
predictable, and sometimes crippling tradeoff between innovation and effectiveness. In the business 
literature on innovation, this is often referred to as the explore-exploit dilemma. Put simply, organizations 
which are good at “exploring” (i.e. innovating), tend to make significant sacrifices in “exploitation” (i.e. 
everyday production and efficiency). In other words, the very things that make an organization good at 
innovating — nonhierarchical structures, hands-off management techniques, nontraditional professional 
development and rewards, etc. — can be liabilities when it comes to consistent execution. The holy grail 
is thus to balance exploration and exploitation, a feat which only a handful of businesses can claim to 
have achieved. 
In the military, this challenge is doubly problematic. First, in a world of constrained resources, 
innovation and change in one area can often undermine the military’s ability to deliver on other mission 
sets. It should therefore come as little surprise that investments in the third offset may weaken our ability 
to successfully carry out other missions, and this trade-off should explicitly be part of the discussion. For 
example, after a decade of investing in counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare capabilities, the 
third offset may very well mean that these new skills are left to atrophy as resources move elsewhere. 
Second, the explore-exploit tradeoff has costs that are far more consequential in the military than in 
the private sector. For the private sector, the success and failure of innovation is measured in dollars. For 
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the military, success and failure is measured in battlefield effectiveness and, sometimes, lives. Thus, while 
investing in new technologies may leave Google or Amazon strapped for cash, the costs of shifting 
investment priorities in the defense community are on a different scale entirely. We therefore need to 
acknowledge and understand where innovation will make us stronger and where it will make us weaker, 
so we can avoid sending our troops into situations where they are ill-equipped for the task at hand. 
 
2. Vulnerability 
Innovations are, by definition, new. This is precisely what makes them so exciting and effective — 
especially in the military context where surprise can lead to significant battlefield gains. 
But for all of the new capabilities that come with innovative technologies and doctrines, we often 
forget the vulnerabilities that accompany new technologies. Take the Internet, for example. It enables us 
to undertake crippling cyberattacks against our adversaries, but it also exposes the United States to 
significant risk. 
Similarly, while the push towards unmanned weaponry and greater automation in the defense sector 
provides the U.S. military with unparalleled intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), and 
strike capabilities at low risk to U.S. lives, the increased reliance on satellites required by these platforms 
creates a new — and often underappreciated — set of challenges. As Jacquelyn Schneider notes, the 
United States’ increasing reliance on cyber capabilities creates a “capability-vulnerability paradox.” 
While U.S. investments in cyber-technologies might allow the military to conduct strikes further away 
from the battlefield and with greater effectiveness, the increased dependence on satellite relay nodes, 
intelligence infrastructure, and GPS communication create new opportunities for attack. 
In short, new capabilities create new vulnerabilities, and we should not be too sanguine about the 
risks attached to the high-tech advances envisaged by the third offset. This is especially so in a world 
where interoperability challenges, jamming, cyberattacks, and counter-stealth technologies are a 
persistent and growing threat. 
 
3. Financial 
As a purely practical matter, the financial costs of innovation should not be lost on the architects of these 
reforms. After all, there is a reason why many start-ups fail — innovation can be capital- and time-
intensive, and there is no guarantee that the product will ultimately prove viable when it makes it to the 
market. For every successful innovation there are many ideas, prototypes, and alternatives that never make 
it off of the cutting room floor. And even when they do, long time horizons means that costs can add up. 
Those in the defense R&D and procurement communities know this fact all too well. Indeed, the cost 
overruns associated with developing new military technologies have become par for the course in most 
major U.S. military acquisitions of recent years, as the lack of truly competitive bidding and tendency 
toward over-commitment have exploded acquisitions costs. But in addition to the standard reasons for the 
overruns that often accompany defense acquisitions, the technologies of the third offset will likely involve 
advanced, proprietary, and even covert technologies, all of which can result in a big price tag and offer 
little guarantee of long-term utility. 
As Stephen Rodriguez highlighted here at War on the Rocks, the last attempt at technological offset 
came with some incredibly expensive budgetary causalities, and there is no reason to think this time will 
be any different. To be fair, some leaders at DoD are well aware of the financial costs of the third offset, 
and many will be mitigated by savings accrued from other, more successful innovations. Nevertheless, we 
should not be naïve about the material costs that this initiative will require. 
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4. Culture of Hierarchy 
There are many reasons we should expect the military to resist major innovation. As James Q. Wilson 
and Barry Posen have pointed out elsewhere: Organizations are created to minimize uncertainty, change 
inherently introduces uncertainty, and thus we should not be surprised when organizations resist change. 
Some of this resistance is unnecessary, and hamstrings the military when it attempts to introduce 
valuable new technologies. However, it is important to remember that, perhaps more than any other 
organization in the world, the military relies on a culture of order, discipline, and hierarchy — 
formalized in the military chain of command — in order to perform its duties well. And so while 
innovation may be critical in some areas of the military, the benefits of decentralized, independent 
thinking must always be weighed against the risks of degrading the military hierarchy — a difficult 
balance to strike for even the most modern militaries. 
Of course, challenging hierarchy is not always bad, and innovation on the battlefield can also save 
lives. Nevertheless, we should not overestimate the value of innovation at the expense of overlooking the 
critical importance of hierarchy and structure to U.S. military effectiveness. 
 
5. Strategic-Tactical 
Perhaps the most understood risk of the innovations that will come with the defense reforms of recent 
months is the risk of “putting the technology cart before the strategy horse,” as Jon Czarnekcki so pithily 
put it. Indeed, the contributors at War on the Rocks have led the way in assessing how technological 
innovation absent complementary strategic, doctrinal, and organizational change is both useless and 
potentially counterproductive to political and national security ends. Technology can enable significant 
war-fighting gains, but rarely does it induce revolutionary change alone. Military officials are well aware 
of this, but their civilian bosses often need reminding that investments in technology must accompany 
investments in training and exercises. 
None of these warnings are meant to say that the military should avoid attempts at reform and 
innovation. Indeed, it is precisely because the U.S. military has found ways to innovate that it has become 
the most formidable military in the world. The reforms that will be undertaken by the defense community 
in the coming years will undoubtedly lead to important and significant gains for the U.S. military. But to 
ignore the risks associated with such an enterprise is analytically lazy and practically dangerous. Instead, 
by acknowledging, understanding, and anticipating the risks of innovation, the United States will be better 
placed to counteract these challenges, and better able meet future threats. 
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IMPACTS OF THE ROBOTICS AGE ON NAVAL FORCE STRUCTURE PLANNING  
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This discussion’s theme is that our overly platform-focused naval force structure planning and 
acquisition system is burdened with so many inhibitors to change that we are ill-prepared to capitalize 
on the missile and robotics age of warfare. Refocusing our efforts to emphasize the “right side” of an 
offensive kill chain to deliver kinetic and non-kinetic effects will aid in overcoming these challenges 
and prioritize our efforts towards identifying where cutting edge technologies can best be applied in 
naval warfare. The dialog addresses traditional foundations for force structure planning, inhibitors to 
changing force structure, and how focusing on the packages for platform delivery instead of the 
platforms will allow us to better leverage new technologies. 
Ideally, naval force structure grows from national strategy, national treasury, technology 
advancement, and potential adversary capabilities to build required ships, aircraft and capabilities. 
National strategy provides the rationale, purpose, and priority of choices to be made in creating a fleet. 
National treasure provides both the resources and constraints. New technologies provide opportunities 
for increasing fleet effectiveness, and may also potentially expose vulnerabilities to fleet survival when 
adversary capabilities are considered. This is a complex problem with only these four factors. In reality, 
however, U.S. force structure planning is also challenged by other influences, impactful on planning 
and budgeting for the fleet’s composition. These other pressures inhibit capitalization of new 
technologies and slow reaction in the face of new challenges.  
The most powerful inhibitor is inertia caused by an existing fleet being a large national capital 
investment with long build and life times. Ships and aircraft cost billions to design, build, and maintain. 
They require a capital-intensive industry requiring heavy equipment, infrastructure, and a skilled 
workforce, all generations in the making. The consequence is annual programming and budgeting 
decisions are marginal in nature. It is the nature of a large fleet to evolve slowly, in lieu of 
revolutionary changes to its composition. 
Since our first six frigates were authorized in 1794, national internal political and economic factors 
have been another major influence on fleet composition. Illustrated well by Ian Toll in his Six Frigates: 
The Epic History of the Founding of the U.S. Navy, the potential windfalls on local economies when 
selected to provide force structure generate powerful political pressures on force generation decisions 
and create the desire for stabilization once those selections are made.  
Next, over-compartmentalization in fleet planning, budgeting, building, and maintenance, with 
large and resource-competing bureaucracies executing these functions, creates a lethargic and 
inefficient environment for change. Multiple oversight agencies, including Congress, make any 
decision by one program manager susceptible to over-zealous scrutiny which dis-incentivizes 
innovation. Agility is lost when the number of stakeholders exceeds the point where responsibility and 
authority cannot be clearly defined. 
Finally, the very nature of a fleet’s strategic value engenders conservatism in senior naval 
leadership when faced with options for change. This is not necessarily an unhealthy view as the loss of 
the fleet can mean the loss of sea lines of communication and therefore a war. None-the-less, over 
valuing what worked in the last major maritime war, at the expense of not recognizing technology that 
changes the conveyance of maritime power, can result in a fleet not prepared to combat an enemy that 
is not so inhibited. 
None of these influences on force structure planning can be lightly dismissed. The danger is that 
collectively they result in harmful escalation of commitment toward obsolete platforms and only 
marginal changes in force structure in the face of major technological changes. The result today is a 
brittle U.S. Fleet that is susceptible to capability surprise. 
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The United States in not unique in facing these challenges. Historically, major changes to naval force 
structure have resulted from war and/or great technology leaps. Ramming, row and boarding vessels gave 
way to the naval cannon and sail; sail to steam; rifled gun and armor to aircraft; aircraft to missiles; and 
now we are on the dawn of a robotics age. Missiles, robots, and artificial intelligence give the advantage 
to smaller, many, faster, and more lethal offense capabilities. Our challenge is to not allow restraints on 
the current force structure planning process to cede these advantages to potential adversaries. 
Meeting the 2015 maritime strategic capabilities of all domain access, deterrence, sea control and 
power projection, and maritime security while constrained by the budget and procurement process, and 
contested by potential adversaries’ growing capabilities, will require new thinking in platforms, weapons, 
and command and control. Advancement into the robotic age allows us to emphasize options to achieve a 
desired tactical end state which enables our operational and strategic goals. For example, investing in a 
very “smart” long range autonomous offensive missile that can out-range those of our adversary may 
permit us to build less-expensive, less well-defended ships from which to launch them thereby making sea 
control more affordable. Consider a new frigate with helicopter to hunt and armed with long-range missile 
to kill against today’s DDG Flight III without any over-the-horizon missile. Granted, better to have a 
DDG Flight III armed with the same long-range missile, so long as we can afford sufficient DDGs with 
these capabilities to meet all of the other strategic capabilities around the world, the most capacity-
demanding being maritime security. But our budget constrains us. The message here is not necessarily to 
favor a frigate over a DDG, but to refocus our investments on less expensive “payloads” delivered, kinetic 
or cyber, not the more expensive delivery platforms. A stark example is a weapon that has huge maritime 
influence but no maritime platform, the DF-21. Focusing on offensive payloads also lessens many of the 
political, economic, and bureaucratic challenges associated with large capital investment platform 
programs. We are not there yet. In the FY17 DoD President’s budget, a bit over 40% of the budget is for 
aircraft and ships, only 9% for munitions. 
This “package focus” first is particularly applicable in the electromagnetic and cyber realm. 
Inexpensive, deposable UAVs employing radar reflectors or chirp jamming may be better delivery 
platforms for EM “packages” than an F-18 Growler. In the offense, developing “Left of kill chain” effects 
against an adversary need not be expensive, but does require synchronization with the movement of actual 
forces. The desired effects may rely as much on advisory perception as on physical outcomes. The 
solutions here may be more organizational, training and in the area of concept of employment than force 
structure additions. 
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PANEL 3: NAVY FORCE DEVELOPMENT 
RETHINKING THE NAVY’S STRATEGIC PRESUMPTIONS AND PLANNING PROCEDURES  
 
Mr. Paul S. Giarra 
Global Strategies & Transformation 
 
A One-Ocean Navy? 
Strategic planners should challenge the whittled down presumptions and planning of today's navy, which 
likes to think of itself as a global navy but is headed for relevance in only one ocean. At that, if the Asia-
Pacific is the model for thinking about the one-ocean Navy, relevance is not necessarily going to be the 
same as prevalence. 
At best, with every innovative basing scheme and crew-swap program imaginable, current global 
Navy deployment schedules will be hard pressed to keep more than a single battle group forward 
deployed in any region in peacetime. This is more than a ship count issue, especially when it is fairly 
obvious that the ship repair base can’t keep up even with this force structure when the schedule is 
disrupted. Every shred of redundancy has been wrung out of the force and the support establishment, 
apparently based upon presumptions of unchallenged deployments and no operational surges. 
To make matters worse, it has been many decades since the U.S. Navy has been challenged as the 
presumptive guarantor of freedom of the seas. Even ten years ago, there was not another regional navy to 
challenge this rhetoric. Now, China, Russia, and soon Iran will challenge regionally at least. This rapid 
threat emergence is reminiscent of the post-Cuban Missile Crisis rise of the Soviet Navy. Even if that 
were not going to be true, there are many more key maritime straits and crossroads besides the South 
China Sea that need to be vouchsafed -- from the Mediterranean to the Baltic to the Gulf of Aden -- than 
the Navy has the force structure to cover. This warranty deficit is not lost on interested observers who 
have a stake in the outcome on one side or the other.  
We should not be willing to accept this regressive outcome as foreordained, not if it is true that as 
goes the Navy, so goes the Nation. The Navy’s strategic presumptions and force planning procedures no 
longer are adequate. 
 
What Will War At Sea Look Like? 
To make matters worse, war at sea is going to be quite different in terms of scope and scale than anything 
being discussed publicly, which is an imperfect but useful gauge of what is being considered in the 
classified process. There will be other differences that have to be sorted out, but this issue of scope and 
scale refers to regional warfare that is going to be much, much more difficult and destructive than 
anything generally being considered. Furthermore, regional naval warfare also will be very dependent 
upon the ground components for support in places like China’s “Three Seas”, the Mediterranean, the 
Baltic, the North Sea, and the Persian Gulf, while naval forces will have to be able to support the ground 
component in turn.  
Most important, the potential for escalation in maritime conflict is high because that is where our 
forces will come together, and equally unacceptable: because in an age of generally unconstrained 
nuclear, cyber, and space warfare, the civilizational risks of escalation are unthinkable. This means that 
the U.S. navy is going to have to maintain a force structure that is in a forward-leaning operational 
posture; with overbearing operational capabilities; and with dependable and robust command and control 
and ISR sufficient to dominate escalation continuously. 
The circumstantial backdrop of real war at sea makes the case for this conclusion. As one example, in 
the Asia-Pacific this would be war against the Chinese Communist Party, which as the progenitor of 
China’s emergence to challenge the status quo – in other words, the rules-based order that was established 
after World War II but not buttressed since the end of the Cold War – has no room for compromise. 
Conflict once started will be extremely difficult to control. Second, the maritime democracies are going to 
have to contend at a minimum with the Three Navies – China, Russia, and Iran – which may not always 
29 
The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or  
position of the Department of the Navy, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. 
operate in close coordination but which will split defenses and at a minimum seriously challenge 
resources. Third, Navy operational presumptions regarding connectivity and reach may not hold in the 
face of cyber attacks; precision guided munitions and the missile-enabled loss of air control; and standoff 
defenses. 
 
This is a Job for the CNO, Not for the COCOMS or the Joint Staff 
These are problems with national and global implications, but it is going to have to be the Navy, in the 
person of the CNO and not some remote staff in the hinterlands or the wilderness of the Pentagon, that is 
going to have to sort out an escalation dominance strategy or something like it; derive the operational 
requirements; articulate the strategy to the White House, the Congress, and the public; argue for the 
necessary resources; and get the fleet ready. 
So far, this is aspirational. Congressman Randy Forbes referred to this “deficit of strategic thinking” 
in a letter to CNO Greenert. 
Congressman Forbes’s central point in his letter was that technology, programs, and force structure 
were driving strategy, instead of the other way around: 
It makes eminent sense to start with the Maritime Strategy, developed by the Chief of Naval 
Operations, but in recent years we seem to have turned ourselves upside down by increasingly 
emphasizing programs and force structure rather than starting with a strategy based on what we need 
naval forces to do and in what scenarios. 
 
“What’s the Answer” vs. “What is the Question” 
The congressman has put his finger on a central issue. We have put a tremendous amount of energy into 
trying to derive the answer, rather than asking, “What are the right questions?” This “answer first” 
approach shows clearly in the Navy’s current vernacular debates over LCS and carriers, for instance, and 
in the contretemps over integrating unmanned aircraft into carrier air wings. 
A more appropriate starting point might be to determine the Navy’s strategic purpose going forward, 
and in what context; and then derive the force structure, force levels, and capabilities necessary to get the 
job done. This approach, however, challenges the entire Pentagon planning structure based upon program 
continuity and programmatic defense of resources, “no matter what.” 
To the contrary, however, the commanders who win will be those who held decisive control decades 
before the war starts, and who anticipated strategy, tactics, and technological trends.
1
 Otherwise, without 
the right presumptions, whatever resources are available will be squandered. 
 
The Second Offset Strategy as an example 
The Second Offset Strategy process is one good example of how to approach such a vital problem. It 
grew out of the mid-1970s ARPA/DNA Long Range Research & Development Planning Program 
(LR
2
DP
2
), which convened three key panels consisting of government and industry experts. The program 
had the benefit of experienced analytical contractors and panel members with the background in 
sophisticated military equipment development critical to identifying solutions capable of providing 
practical operational capability. The three panels were: the Alternatives Panel; the Advanced Technology 
Panel; and the Munitions Panel.
2
 
The programs and capabilities that originated in the [second] offset strategy, many of which were not 
fielded until the late 1980s and early 1990s, revolutionized conventional warfare, assured American 
dominance in large-scale ground combat, and eventually drove potential adversaries to “design around” 
American conventional superiority by employing asymmetric advantages. The offset strategy evolved 
                                                 
1 Stefan T. Possony and J.E. Pournelle, The Strategy of Technology:  Winning the Decisive War, University Press of Cambridge, 
Mass., 1970 (1st edition) 
2, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, “ARPA/DNA Long Range Research & Development Planning Program 
(LR2DP2), Final Report of the Advanced Technology Panel”, U.S. Department of Defense, 30 April 1975, p. iv. 
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concurrently with doctrine – which came to favor rapid, decisive operations to quickly defeat adversaries 
– but also largely ignored urban operations and counterinsurgency missions. 
The offset strategy led to major improvements in stealth, precision strike, battlefield information and 
communications systems, intelligence systems, positioning and navigation capabilities, and training. 
Innovation in each of these areas was focused on a single strategic objective: offsetting the Warsaw Pact’s 
conventional superiority in Europe, and lowering NATO’s reliance on nuclear weapons to deter – or in 
time of war defend against – a Soviet attack.
3
 
A key aspect of this successful approach was that DoD brought together into the same room a select 
group of operators, analysts, engineers, and industrialists. Furthermore, they had the advantage of having 
a clear strategy to which they could refer. 
The purpose of the overall LR
2
DP
2
 effort was to assess, in as systematic a manner as practicable, 
what possible shifts or emphasis in the U.S. Defense R&D program were implied by the strategy of 
Flexible Response that has been set forth by former President Nixon and secretary of Defense 
Schlesinger. The overall approach was to investigate representative conflict scenarios that come under the 
general heading of “Limited Soviet Aggression.”
4
 
 
Net Assessment as an Example 
A similar procedural approach is the Net Assessment process of carefully correlated data-driven 
comparisons in areas of military competition that identify overlaps where comparative advantage can be 
leveraged or banked; and underlaps, wherein risks can be redressed or accepted and factored into 
strategies and plans. In this contemporary process, Net Assessment Director Andrew Marshall raised to a 
high art getting the right people in the room and asking them the right questions. 
 
The Relationship Between Strategy and Technology/Force Structure 
This right-minded capabilities derivation process is an example of what Possony and Pournelle refer to as 
“technology war”. There is no argument regarding the power of American technology, only that strategy 
should come first. If strategy were to come first – and Congressman Forbes has flagged for us that it does 
not – then strategic presumptions and planning procedures would be quite different, and so would our 
conversations about force development and technology. As Possony and Pournelle point out, 
As we have repeatedly stated, the Technological War must be fought as are other wars; that is, it must 
be fought according to a strategy. A military general who simply muddles through, overcoming each 
obstacle as it comes to him, fighting battles at the dictation of the enemy, and preparing only for battles 
already fought, would soon lose the war. Yet, too often it is thought that the technological War, which 
may be the moist decisive engagement in the history of mankind, can be fought with precisely this 
technique. Technology is made the driving force, dictating to strategy; and strategy is conceived of as the 
employment of systems already created by the technologists, that is, strategy is confined to operational 
decisions. This is akin to allowing the munitions manufacturer to decide the conduct of the war.
5
 
                                                 
3 Robert Tomes, “The Cold War Offset Strategy: Origins and Relevance,” War On The Rocks, November 6, 2014, 
http://warontherocks.com/2014/11/the-cold-war-offset-strategy-origins-and-relevance/#_ 
4 “ARPA/DNA Long Range Research & Development Planning Program (LR2DP2), Final Report of the Advanced Technology 
Panel,” p. 1 
5 Possony and Pournelle, p. 57. 
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PANEL 4: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON MARITIME STRATEGY 
THE SUITABILITY OF GRAND STRATEGY FOR TODAY 
 
Dr. Lukas Milevski 
Changing Character of War Programme, Oxford University 
 
This paper deals not with maritime strategy and security directly, but rather with one of its progeny concepts—
grand strategy, an important contextual idea for sea power. Grand strategy in a recognizably modern form was 
first implied and developed by maritime thinkers such as Alfred Thayer Mahan and Julian Stafford Corbett, 
specifically because the maritime sphere enabled non-military instruments to have utility in a way which could 
not be the case in western Europe. As Mahan argued, “[t]he diplomatist, as a rule, only affixes the seal of treaty 
to the work done by the successful soldier. It is not so with a large proportion of strategic points upon the sea.”
1
 
The influence of maritime strategy broadened grand strategy—a pre-existing term—from being purely a 
military concept to one with far-reaching responsibilities with the addition of non-military instruments. Yet, 
unlike the amorphous notions of grand strategy which were to come later in the twentieth century and whose 
value is arguable, this first broadened notion of grand strategy remained fixed on war and adversarial 
relationships between polities.
2
 The focus of an inquiry into the suitability of grand strategy for today will focus 
on the utility of non-military instruments as independent executors of policy within adversarial relationships. 
Implied by the broadened formulation of grand strategy as the employment of both military and non-
military instruments for political purposes is the notion that military and non-military means obey the same 
logic and are equal in value and utility. This is not the case. Military power has the capacity to impose and 
control. This is most forcefully realized through land power, but less so with sea power, air power, and cyber 
power. These latter forms of military power may take control solely in their own domains but can only deny 
control in the wider context of the conflict as a whole.
3
 Denial of control through military force is, of all 
military power, most similar in logic to that of the non-military instruments. Yet in general, military power 
has the capability to impose upon the enemy an ultimate situation in which the adversary must make a 
choice either for peace or for the continuation of war. This reverses Lawrence Freedman’s revision of the 
wars of necessity versus wars of choice distinction, changing it instead to obligatory versus voluntary 
decisions about war.
4
  
The logic of non-military power differs substantially. “Coercive diplomacy needs to be distinguished from 
pure coercion. It seeks to persuade the opponent to cease his aggression rather than bludgeon him into 
stopping. In contrast to the crude use of force to repel the opponent, coercive diplomacy emphasizes the use of 
threats and the exemplary use of limited force to persuade him to back down.”
5
 Thus non-military power 
cannot take control, instead being a collection of instruments whose purpose is pure denial. The particular 
character of this denial depends on the specific non-military instrument employed. Denial through economic 
sanctions differs in its effect from information dominance and propaganda, which differs from diplomatic 
pressure, etc. 
This denial of control is represented by the bloodless trends, which are interpreted through trends 
analysis and may require very long periods of time to manifest. Iran, for instance, had been under economic 
sanctions of ever-increasing pressure since 1995, a whole generation ago. It is possible to imagine the 
logical endpoint of a policy of economic sanctions to be, for example, the destruction of the citizenry of a 
nation unable to import the necessary food. Few sanctioning countries, however, would be willing to push 
their policies so far. Few policy-makers relish the notion of imposing a public, slow-motion massacre of 
innocents across an entire state. Thus most decisions made under non-military duress are usually voluntary 
rather than necessary. 
                                                 
1 Alfred Thayer Mahan. Naval Strategy compared and contrasted with the principles and practice of military operations on land. 
(London: Sampson Low, Marston & Company 1911), 123. 
2 Lukas Milevski. The Evolution of Modern Grand Strategic Thought. (Oxford: Oxford UP 2016). 
3 Lukas Milevski. “Revisiting J.C. Wylie’s Dichotomy of Strategy: The Effects of Sequential and Cumulative Patterns of 
Operations,” Journal of Strategic Studies 35/2 (April 2012), 223-242. 
4 Lawrence Freedman. “The Counterrevolution in Strategic Affairs,” Daedalus 140/3 (Summer 2011), 23. 
5 Gordon A. Craig & Alexander L. George. Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time. (Oxford: Oxford UP 1983), 189. 
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The utility of both military and non-military power is necessarily contextual—to the manner in which it is 
employed, to the particular character and characteristics of the opponent, etc. Both military and non-military 
instruments are difficult to employ with the desired degree of success, and use of the military is not a panacea, 
as the American strategic experience of the past fifteen years only too readily testifies. Yet of the two, non-
military power is arguably more susceptible to going awry due to context than is military force, because it 
cannot compel a polity in the same way that the military can. Non-military power must rely upon the 
opponent’s own perceptions of his situation. 
Thus, the sanctions on Iraq in the 1990s did not work. Relative to the policy goals the United States 
sought—Saddam Hussein’s ouster and the termination of his WMD program—sanctions simply could not 
supply the required duress.
6
 Similarly, Russia’s political use of its energy dominance in Europe, particularly 
eastern Europe, has had mixed results and often failed to alter the policies of even weak neighbors.
7
 Thus far, 
the West’s sanctions on Russia, even when combined with the much more significant collapse in the price of 
oil, have not yet triggered the desired change in Russia’s foreign policy behavior, nor even in the behavior of 
Russia’s proxies in the Donbas. With regards to the sanctions against Russia, however, it is notable that the 
West has not cut off Russian access to the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication 
(SWIFT), an act which ultimately brought Iran to the negotiating table after 2013.
8
 
Why is it that non-military instruments, having been first introduced into strategic theory at the end of the 
nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries (in broader historical terms, not so long ago), seem to be 
losing their apparent utility—albeit not their popularity? It is the context that has greatly changed from just 
over a century ago. When Mahan and Corbett wrote, the context in which they wrote and of which they wrote 
was peripheral but imperial. That is, maritime strategy could only be practiced on the edges of the European 
continent and across the expanses of sea between Europe and the myriad imperial possessions of European 
powers. Imperial possessions were rarely considered to be intrinsically important either as territory or for 
political consequences in Europe itself. Portions of empires could be traded or bartered in a manner unlikely to 
occur within Europe and there were few to gainsay such transactions, even in adversarial relationships. 
Today, the old empires are mostly gone, replaced by successor states, many of which are nations. 
National states mean national territory and national policies. Many are ruled by authoritarian figures, some 
of whom rely upon national feeling to buttress their rule or their own popularity—such as Putin today. To 
surrender national territory or change national policies under duress, whether military or non-military, 
within an adversarial relationship would be deeply unpopular. It might spell the end of one’s government, 
of the regime, perhaps even of the authoritarian figure’s life should he be unlucky. Military force is 
generically more useful than non-military power because the necessity of obliging the enemy to make a 
decision is often required. 
Yet this context remains largely unrecognized in the West, for whom non-military instruments are usually 
the first—and often only—one to be employed in a confrontation. This may be because, even as the world 
remains national and political, many states in the West are focusing increasingly on the market and on making 
money, particularly in the aftermath of the financial crisis. Such market-states are “largely indifferent to the 
norms of justice, or for that matter to any particular set of moral values so long as law does not act as an 
impediment to economic competition.”
9
 This emphasis persuades Western political leaders to value non-
military power above its real worth to effect actual change, because this is the set of instruments which seems 
best suited to applying pressure on Western powers. 
The notion of grand strategy as the use for political purposes of all instruments, both military and non-
military, requires revision if it is to be relevant today. Non-military instruments in particular appear to have lost 
utility as direct and independent executors of policy, but there are other ways in which they may be used to 
beneficial effect even in adversarial relationships and war. 
                                                 
6 John Mueller & Karl Mueller. “Sanctions of Mass Destruction,” Foreign Affairs 78/3 (May-June 1999), 43-53. 
7 Karen Smith Stegen. “Deconstructing the ‘energy weapon’: Russia’s threat to Europe as case study,” Energy Policy 39 (2011), 6511. 
8 On the Iranian success, see Daniel W. Drezner. “Targeted Sanctions in a World of Global Finance,” International Interactions 
41/4 (2015), 758-759. 
9 Phillip Bobbitt. The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace and the Course of History. (London: Allen Lane 2002), 230. 
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PANEL 4: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON MARITIME STRATEGY 
COMPUTATIONAL APPROACHES TO STRATEGIC REASONING: MARITIME STRATEGY  
AND BEYOND 
 
Mr. Adam Elkus 
PhD student, George Mason University 
 
The emergence of cyber conflict, robotics, artificial intelligence, and autonomous systems as either 
current or future elements of conflict pose significant issues for the craft of strategy. 
1
 Many believe that 
emerging information technology platforms – in challenging the very fundamentals of human 
decisionmaking and control over the rationalization of violence – will be a decisive break from all that we 
know. Those tasked with maritime strategy in particular must deal with the challenge of integrating 
unmanned aerial vehicles and unmanned sea vehicles into strategies and concepts of operation. 
2
 
However, the biggest challenge that the Navy and other entities face lies in thinking about strategy 
and decision from a computational point of view. A world in which the power of computation is 
increasingly inescapable needs analysts to draw broader connections between computation and existing 
strategic theory and history rather than merely building strategic analysis and concepts around whatever 
technological tools temporarily rule the day. 
Hence, this paper argues for the utility of a computational approach to strategic reasoning. A 
computational approach takes familiar aspects of strategy and recasts them in terms of computational 
processes such as algorithms and programs for search, learning, and optimization. A computational 
approach also allows strategic analysis and explanation to be formalized and implemented as a computer 
program on a standard desktop computer or laptop. 
Most importantly, computational approaches begin from a recognition of shared human and machine 
limitations on strategy and decision. Rationality – bounded or not – does not entail omniscience, and a 
computational approach promotes a view of strategy as an adaptive means of fulfilling goals in spite of 
them. 
3
 Understanding both commonalities and differences in human and machine views of strategy and 
adversarial behavior will not only shed light on current strategic challenges but also contribute to broader 
knowledge and understanding in strategic theory. 
4
 
The paper provides a basic proof of concept by showing how aspects of Cold War strategy – 
including maritime strategy and operations – may be simulated through a multi-agent model of nuclear 
conflict. The commercial nuclear strategy game of DEFCON presents a simple Cold War simulation 
where players – unaware of each other’s dispositions – place ground units and naval fleets and then 
progress from surveilling each other’s dispositions to progressively more escalatory levels of combat. 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Adams, Thomas K. “Future warfare and the decline of human decisionmaking.” Parameters 31.4 (2001): 57, 
Liles, Samuel, et al. “Applying traditional military principles to cyber warfare.” 2012 4th International Conference on Cyber 
Conflict (CYCON 2012). 2012, Manzo, Vincent. “Deterrence and Escalation in Cross-domain Operations.” JFQ: Joint Force 
Quarterly 66 (2012): 8-14. 
2 Yan, Ru-jian, et al. “Development and missions of unmanned surface vehicle.” Journal of Marine Science and Application 9.4 
(2010): 451-457, Bruzzone, Gabriele, et al. “Autonomous mine hunting mission for the Charlie USV.” OCEANS, 2011 IEEE-
Spain. IEEE, 2011, Manley, Justin E. “Unmanned surface vehicles, 15 years of development.” OCEANS 2008. IEEE, 2008, Borck, 
Hayley, et al. “Active Behavior Recognition in Beyond Visual Range Air Combat.” Proceedings of the Third Annual Conference 
on Advances in Cognitive Systems ACS. 2015, Callam, Andrew. “Drone Wars: armed unmanned aerial vehicles.” International 
Affairs Review 18 (2015), Savuran, Halil, and Murat Karakaya. “Efficient route planning for an unmanned air vehicle deployed on 
a moving carrier.” Soft Computing (2015): 1-16, Ehrhard, Thomas P., and Robert O. Work. The Unmanned Combat Air System 
Carrier Demonstration Program: A New Dawn for Naval Aviation?. Washington: Center for Strategic and Budgetary 
Assessments, 2007, Wadley, Jason, Gregory Tallant, and Robert Ruszkowski. “Adaptive Flight Control of a Carrier Based 
Unmanned Air Vehicle.” AIAA Guidance, Navigation, and Control Conference, AIAA-2003-5596, Austin, TX, August. 2003.  
3 Russell, Stuart Jonathan, and Eric Wefald. Do the right thing: studies in limited rationality. MIT press, 1991, Takemura, 
Kazuhisa. Behavioral Decision Theory: Psychological and Mathematical Descriptions of Human Choice Behavior. Springer, 2014. 
4 For a comparative overview, see Pomerol, Jean-Charles. Decision Making and Action. John Wiley & Sons, 2012. 
34 
The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or  
position of the Department of the Navy, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. 
Every game culminates in total nuclear exchange. Via an application programming interface (API) written 
in the programming language C++, modelers can program computer players to play automated matches. 
While DEFCON is in many ways a very unrealistic depiction of nuclear war, programming automated 
players to fight each other reveals the most important finding of the computational approach. All systems 
– from slime molds to states – are limited in time and space in the amount of choices that can be 
considered and must resolve tradeoffs in goals and behaviors. All entities are capable of improving their 
performance through adaptation and learning, but face similar limitations and tradeoffs in what can be 
learned and how it is learned. 
5
 Programming strategy game players similarly involves tradeoffs between 
different goal-driven strategic behaviors and reactionary responses to unexpected events. 
The similarities and difference between human and machine strategy game players is often 
instructive; the former often internalize ways to compress or abstract the game in ways that the latter do 
not. What both have in common, however, is the reality of constraints, limitations, and tradeoffs in how 
they decide what to do next. Herbert Simon’s concept of “bounded rationality” – often popularly 
understood as cognitive and human limits on reasoning and optimal decision – actually may have 
originally been used to describe the process of deriving approximations for military operations and 
logistics problems that were too tough to compute exact solutions for in the early Cold War. 
6
 
Computational models and simulations have often been used for operations research and analysis, 
wargaming, and simulation and training. In general, however, computational models are rarely if ever 
utilized for theory development and abstract strategic reasoning. In sum, despite the problematic Cold 
War origins of computational approaches, this paper suggests that the real utility of computer programs 
that model strategic problems is theory development and contribution to the collective knowledge base of 
the strategy community. 
                                                 
5 See, for example, Tyrrell, Toby. Computational mechanisms for action selection. Diss. University of Edinburgh, 1993, Maes, 
Pattie. “Modeling adaptive autonomous agents.” Artificial life 1.1_2 (1993): 135-162, Tyrrell, Toby. “The use of hierarchies for 
action selection.” Adaptive Behavior 1.4 (1993): 387-420, Tu, Xiaoyuan. Artificial animals for computer animation: 
biomechanics, locomotion, perception, and behavior. Springer Science & Business Media, 1999, Brom, Cyril, and Joanna 
Bryson. “Action selection for intelligent systems.” European Network for the Advancement of Artificial Cognitive Systems 
(2006), Prescott, Tony J., Joanna J. Bryson, and Anil K. Seth. “Introduction. Modelling natural action selection.” Philosophical 
Transactions of the Royal Society of London B: Biological Sciences 362.1485 (2007): 1521-1529, Bryson, Joanna J. 
“Mechanisms of action selection: Introduction to the special issue.” Adaptive Behavior 15.1 (2007): 5-9, Bryson, Joanna. “Cross-
paradigm analysis of autonomous agent architecture.” Journal of Experimental & Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 12.2 (2000): 
165-189, De Sevin, Etienne, and Daniel Thalmann. “A motivational model of action selection for virtual humans.” Computer 
Graphics International 2005. IEEE, 2005, Scheutz, Matthias, and Virgil Andronache. “Architectural mechanisms for dynamic 
changes of behavior selection strategies in behavior-based systems.” Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, Part B: Cybernetics, IEEE 
Transactions on 34.6 (2004): 2377-2395. 
6 Erickson, Paul, et al. How reason almost lost its mind: The strange career of Cold War rationality. University of Chicago 
Press, 2013. 
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PANEL 4: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON MARITIME STRATEGY 
CONTINUING CONTROL: STRATEGIC REASONING FOR THE 21ST CENTURY  
 
Mr. Nicholas C. Prime 
PhD candidate, King’s College London 
 
In the summer of 1950 Captain Joseph ‘J.C.’ Wylie returned to Newport to begin a staff tour at the 
Naval War College. Over the course of his three-year tour Wylie developed and oversaw the short-lived 
‘Advanced Course in Strategy and Sea Power.’ While the course was canceled less than three years 
after his departure, it ultimately resulted in a unique body of scholarship on strategic theory. Along 
with Wylie, and his students, Rear Admiral Henry Eccles and German-American historian Dr. Herbert 
Rosinski would collectively develop what I refer to as the ‘Control School’ of strategy. The defining 
feature of which would be a straightforward idea: the purpose of all war, and by extension the aim of 
any strategy, is the assertion of some desired degree of ‘control’ over the adversary. Expanding outward 
from this basic premise, each of these three intellectuals worked toward the development of a 
comprehensive theory of war and strategy that, while now largely forgotten, can improve the way we 
conceptualize and communicate strategy today. 
 
‘Strategic Reasoning’ 
Herbert Rosinski began his study of strategy by exploring the canonical works of Clausewitz, Mahan, 
Corbett, and others; the intention of which was to reconcile the different patterns of thought that 
become apparent when one looks at strategy on land and strategy at sea. Through the course of his 
years of study Rosinski’s aim evolved. He came to believe that what was needed was the development 
of a comprehensive theory of strategy. Thoroughly Clausewitzian in his thinking, Rosinski sought to 
achieve one of Clausewitz great aims: to reconcile the nature and character of past wars with those that 
clearly marked the turn to a new historical epoch. He believed that the end of the Second World War, 
the maturation of the industrial age, and the dawn of the atomic age, meant that both war and society 
had entered a new historical epoch. Just as the rise of Napoleon’s France had inspired Clausewitz 
attempt to rationalise war as it was, with war as it had been throughout (pre-Napoleonic) history. As 
Rosinski explained: 
 
Today, with our field of strategy so enormously enlarged and our notions of it so 
grievously split between three widely irreconcilable service views – not to mention 
others – the need for a common theory as at least the basis for a meaningful discussion 
of the existing divergences has become incomparably more imperative than in 
Clausewitz’ days. I do not see how we can ever hope to arrive at any unified, rational 
and economic, national strategy except upon the basis of a previously established 
theory of war.
1
 
 
In light of the maturity of the industrial age and the dawn of the nuclear age, Clausewitz definition 
of strategy as the “use of an engagement for the purpose of the war” was no longer fit for purpose.
2
 To 
Rosinski, a comprehensive theory had to unify this out-dated definition with what Rosinski viewed as 
the other conception of strategy hinted at, but not fully developed in On War: “strategy as the overall 
direction of war”.
3
 This idea of two realms of strategy had already been explored by Julian Corbett. The 
British navalist referred to them as ‘Minor Strategy’ and ‘Major Strategy’, what many today would 
term ‘strategy’ and ‘grand strategy’.
4
 
                                                 
1 Herbert Rosinski, ‘Comments on the Theory of War’ (October 1957), p. 3 
2 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Book II, Chapter I; Book III, Chapter I 
3 Rosinski, ‘The Structure of Military Strategy’, p. 18-22; Clausewitz, On War, p. 178 
4 J. S. Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (Annapolis, 1988), p. 308 
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The great value of a comprehensive theory, one inclusive enough to cover the comprehensive 
direction of a nations power (both military and non-military), is in its ability to provide the foundation 
for what Rosinski called ‘strategic reasoning’. Strategic reasoning, he suggested, was an analytical 
methodology that needed to be taught. It was analogous to the ways in which law schools do more than 
teach legal cases, they teach law students to think like lawyers, legal reasoning; likewise, medical 
schools teach more than specific medical cases they teach a broader conception of medical reasoning. 
The means to approach, analyse, and most importantly, communicate about strategy with others across 
the various services and organizations, through an explicit theory, was “imperative in order to provide 
common ground for a discussion and to avoid semantic misunderstandings.”
5
 
 
‘Strategy as Control’ 
This idea of a comprehensive theory of strategy as a form of strategic reasoning is the framework 
through which the work of Wylie, Rosinski, and Henry Eccles should be viewed. It was Wylie who first 
presented the idea that “the aim of any war is to establish some measure of control over the enemy. The 
pattern of action by which this control is sought is the strategy of the war.”
6
 Rosinski, while defining 
strategy as the “comprehensive direction of power”, shared Wylie’s emphasis on control, declaring it 
“the essence of strategy; control being the element which differentiates true strategic action from a 
haphazard series of improvisations.”
7
 
While Rosinski, the consummate scholar, defined the practice of strategy as the “coordination of all 
forces and resources of a community in such a clear and purposeful manner as to: make effective action 
possible, and to maximize the effectiveness of this action.”
8
 Wylie, ever the operator, directed his 
writings quite pointedly towards the thinking and practice of the operator.  
 
The primary aim of the strategist in the conduct of war is some selected degree of control 
of the enemy for the strategist’s own purpose; this is achieved by control of the pattern of 
war; and this control of the pattern of war is had by manipulation of the center of gravity 
of war to the advantage of the strategist and the disadvantage of the opponent.
9
 
 
It is the specific focus on control, and its explicit distinction from – and relationship to – destruction, 
which most distinguishes it from Clausewitz, and the majority of land-centric strategic theory. Though 
this is not to say that their work stands opposed to that of Clausewitz, or even the central role of the 
soldier to strategy, Wylie was quite specific in insisting that the soldier on land was the ultimate 
manifestation of the concept.  
 
The ultimate determinant in war is the man on the scene with the gun. This man is the 
final power in war. He is control. He determines who wins. There are those who would 
dispute this as an absolute, but it is my belief that while other means may critically 
influence war today, after whatever devastation and destruction may be inflicted on an 
enemy, if the strategist is forced to strive for final and ultimate control, he must 
establish, or must present as an inevitable prospect, a man on the scene with a gun. This 
is the soldier. […] I do not claim that the soldier actually on the scene is a requisite in 
every case; but I do believe he must be potentially available, and clearly seen as 
potentially available, for use as the ultimate arbiter. 
10
  
 
                                                 
5 Rosinski, ‘Comments on the Theory of War’, p. 3 
6 J. C. Wylie, Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control (Annapolis, 1989), p. 124 
7 Herbert Rosinski, ‘New Thoughts on Strategy’ (September, 1955), p. 1 
8 Rosinski, ‘The Structure of Military Strategy’, p. 21 
9 Wylie, Military Strategy, p. 77. 
10 Wylie, Military Strategy, p. 72 
37 
The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or  
position of the Department of the Navy, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. 
This statement, in essence reflects Clausewitz own assertion that the aim of war is the destruction of 
the enemy forces, so as to impose one’s will upon them.
11
 Yet it also builds on that assertion by hinting 
at the fact that goals can be achieved without complete destruction, and without this “ultimate arbiter.” 
The critical distinction that Wylie makes is the one between destruction as the end unto itself, and as a 
means to serve the desired ends: the establishment of control. Clausewitz discusses this, at the very 
opening of On War, in the sense of “imposing our will upon the enemy” (which, in essence, is how he 
views control). However, he follows that with the assertion that to “render the enemy powerless”, to 
destroy his means of resistance, is the “true aim of war.”
12
 This distinction as expressed by Clausewitz, 
has, according to Wylie, Rosinski, and Eccles, all too often led strategists to assume the destruction of the 
enemy army is the ultimate objective of the war, without appreciating what precisely the strategist wishes 
to impose upon his enemy.
13
 A focus on control, they argue, provides the ability to properly calibrate the 
type and degree of destruction required. Absent this calibration, unchecked destruction becomes counter-
productive. In discussing the contribution of both the sailor, and the soldier, Wylie argues: 
 
Destruction in each of these two cases is only one component of control, and not the 
whole of it. The soldier exercises ultimate control by his unchallenged presence on the 
scene. The sailor contributes to control in part by destruction, but as much by other 
components. Like the soldier, in some cases, by his presence. Or, as often as not, by 
making possible various political or economic pressures toward control.
14
 
 
The explicit argument, expressed most cogently by Wylie but echoed in the writing of both Rosinski 
and Eccles, is that while the ultimate form of control is the unchallenged presence of “the man on the 
scene with the gun”, it should not be assumed that this is required in all, or perhaps even most, 
instances.
15
 This is, instead, a zero-point baseline and it is equally if not more likely that the degree 
required (or the degree that is realistically achievable) will be a deviation from this baseline. 
The central requirement of the strategist then, is to discern what specifically is the degree of control 
required. Rosinski draws this issue back to the foundational principal of On War: the relationship of war 
to policy.
16
 In essence he upholds the authority of policy over military leadership, with two critical 
caveats. The first being that political leadership must understand the nature and effect of the “tools” it is 
employing, its pre-conditions and possible consequences. The second, stemming from the first, is that 
policy must not ask of military leadership efforts which they are patently incapable of achieving.
17
 
 
‘Continuing Control’  
In developing what Rosinski had referred to as ‘comprehensive control’, which is to say control as the 
focusing concept that governs, and gives purpose to, the overall direction of war and the coordination of 
all forces and resources of the community, Eccles provided what may be a more useful conception in 
‘continuing control’. Like Wylie, Eccles was concerned with the tendency of strategists, both in abstract 
theorizing and war planning, to focus overwhelmingly on destruction as an end unto itself. This 
manifested in what he referred to as ‘weapons strategies’, those that reflexively tend to hone in on a 
specific weapon or system of weapons (belonging either to the strategist or the adversary).
18
 The result of 
this, Eccles argued, is that the strategist tends to pattern his thinking to the capability of the weapon, 
rather than maintaining an agnostic appreciation of the dictates of policy. For Eccles, the benefit of 
phrasing this concept was ‘continuing control’ was that it, “naturally leads to a re-examination and better 
                                                 
11 Clausewitz, On War, Book VIII, Chapter IV 
12 Clausewitz, On War, Book I, Chapter I 
13 Wylie, Military Strategy, p. 47 
14 Wylie, Military Strategy, p. 88 
15 Wylie, Military Strategy, p. 72 
16 Herbert Rosinski, ‘The Structure of Military Strategy’ (November, 1956), pp. 7-9 
17 Rosinski, ‘The Structure of Military Strategy’ (November, 1956), pp. 8-9 
18 See Henry Eccles comments on: Herbert Rosinski, ‘New Thoughts on Strategy’ (September 1955) 
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understanding of the objectives whose attainment is the purpose of the attempt to exercise control.” 
Eccles went on to suggest that: 
 
The concept of continuing control prepares the mind for shifting its emphasis from 
weapon to weapon or from tool to tool in accordance with a changing situation or with 
the changing capabilities and use or application of the weapons or weapon systems 
involved. Thus, [Rosinski’s concept of strategy as “comprehensive control”] naturally 
leads to the intellectual concept of flexibility.
19
 
 
Eccles conception here is, by his own admission, deliberately simplified and capable of considerable 
expansion. Given his emphasis on flexibility as this central principal, a sort of governing virtue of 
strategic thinking, both the concept and wording should be viewed in a broad light.
20
 Like Rosinski, 
Eccles intended to develop a comprehensive theory that applied up and down the various levels of war 
and across the various domains of war. To that end, his call for flexibility in the use or application of 
weapons and weapons systems, I would argue, should be viewed not just within the case of a specific 
service. It should be viewed instead, as speaking to the flexible way in which the services themselves are 
brought to bear in the execution of a given strategy. 
Keeping in mind Rosinski’s argument that the theory of control functions both as a field strategy, and 
in the sense of strategy as the overall direction of war, this idea should be applied at both levels. The idea 
of employing weapons and weapons systems towards continuing control at the level of a field strategy 
should, at the level of overall direction, be viewed as the flexible application of the service’s roles, 
missions, and specific weapons systems. Therefore this should be read in the sense of what we today call 
“joint warfighting”. 
The theory of control, I believe, is both sufficiently broad and coherent to serve as a means of 
strategic reasoning in an era where the conduct of war is highly complex. Complex not only in terms of its 
organisational challenges from inter-service, to inter-agency, and multi-national; but also the challenges 
of its conduct from insurgency, to operational-access, to conventional, and even so called ‘Phase 0’ or 
’Gray Wars’. All of which can be understood and discussed in terms of their central essence: the assertion 
or denial of some degree of control. It is because of this that the theory of control provides a sound basis 
for strategic reasoning, one capable of improving the way we approach, analyse and communicate 
strategic understanding across a range of domains, services, and organizational structures. 
                                                 
19 Ibid 
20 Ibid 
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PANEL 5: MARITIME WARFARE 
“VIRTUAL ATTRITION” AND VICTORY IN MARITIME WARFARE 
 
Mr. Bryan Clark 
Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments  
 
The proliferation of “anti-access” threats such as submarines, anti-ship cruise and ballistic missiles, and 
long-range surveillance systems is today the overriding preoccupation of those who develop maritime 
strategy, build naval weapons, and organize, train, and equip the fleet. The concepts these communities 
pursue rely to a great degree on destroying or killing the enemy and its weapons. This decisive and logical 
approach, however, is not a sustainable one against today’s threats and may actually detract from naval 
forces achieving their objectives. Instead, maritime forces may be better served if they simply avoid 
threats, impose costs on their adversaries, and accomplish the task at hand. 
An enemy force can be taken out of the fight in two main ways. It can be destroyed or killed, which 
could be called “actual attrition,” or it can be marginalized or rendered ineffective, which could be called 
“virtual attrition.” The former requires enemy targets be found and classified precisely, and engaged with 
a weapon able to locate the target and overcome target countermeasures and maneuvers. This sets a pretty 
high bar for reconnaissance and command and control capabilities, weapon seekers, and weapon guidance 
and control systems.  
In contrast, virtual attrition may be achievable with a much less expensive and sophisticated set of 
capabilities. Offensively, it involves friendly forces suppressing enemy operations until the enemy’s 
window of opportunity to conduct them passes. Defensively, virtual attrition can be achieved by 
compelling the enemy to conduct many more attacks than are necessary because of friendly force 
disposition, or due to providing the enemy a false of degraded targeting information. 
 
Some historical examples 
The Allies success in anti-submarine warfare (ASW) during the Battle of the Atlantic is an excellent 
example of virtual attrition in action. In the first year of World War II, less than a dozen Axis submarines 
were on patrol at any given time in the Atlantic Ocean. Despite their small numbers, they imposed 
hundreds of thousands of tons of shipping losses on the Allies attempting to resupply England. These 
losses grew only modestly as the number of Axis submarines on patrol grew to more than 100 in 1941, 
indicating less productivity per submarine. And starting in mid-1942, overall shipping losses per month 
actually decreased, with a few spikes due to specific operational situations. Submarine losses, however, 
were less than about 10 per month throughout the battle until late 1944. Something other than submarine 
losses was causing the U-boat offensive to falter. 
That something else was virtual attrition. Allied ASW efforts, while not resulting in many submarine 
kills, were preventing submarines from getting into position for an effective attack. When they missed 
their window of opportunity, U-boats were marginalized from the fight until another convoy came along, 
and the process would repeat. This dynamic took advantage of a submarine’s limited speed, self defenses, 
and sensor capability. Notably, submarines today still have these limitations relative to the surface ships 
and aircraft arrayed against them. 
Another example is in air defense, although ashore rather than at sea. During the Vietnam War, North 
Vietnamese troops imposed virtual attrition on attacking U.S. aircraft with the introduction of the SA-2 air 
defense system. This surface-to-air missile system was provided by the Soviet Union and made 
operational by the time of Operation Rolling Thunder in 1965. Previous to the SA-2’s introduction, U.S. 
strike aircraft only had to worry about anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) (sometimes radar-guided) and MiG 
interceptor aircraft. Those were negated by flying above the range of AAA guns and bringing fighter 
escorts to counter the MiGs.  
The SA-2 added a new set of threats. It could engage aircraft above the altitude of AAA, taking away 
the sanctuary American aircraft had enjoyed above 10,000 feet. It was also guided by the ground-based 
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radar all the way to the target, making chaff and flares launched by the target aircraft less effective. Even 
though the first generation of SA-2’s had a less than 10 percent probability of killing an aircraft, U.S. air 
forces had to respect the threat it posed. As a result, by the end of Operation Rolling Thunder in 1968, 
half the aircraft in U.S. strike packages were devoted to electronic warfare and defensive counterair 
missions. Most of these aircraft were converted fighters or fighter-bombers, so the SA-2 was able to 
essentially reduce the number of strike aircraft in U.S. air forces by one-half. 
 
Implications for future warfare 
There are several ways U.S. forces could exploit virtual attrition in future conflicts. For example, the anti-
access networks of potential U.S. adversaries such as China or Russia depend on “reconnaissance strike 
complexes” consisting of surveillance systems and long-range precision guided weapons. Because they 
depend on “fire and forget” capabilities, these complexes are vulnerable to counter-targeting operations 
such as electronic warfare, concealment, decoy, and deception. These efforts will compel the enemy to 
use more weapons than desired as they attack false targets, attempt to overwhelm jammers, and launch 
multiple weapon at targets with large areas of uncertainty.  
Enemy reconnaissance strike complexes are also susceptible to suppression attacks by U.S. and allied 
forces. Missile launchers, including those on ships and aircraft, make themselves vulnerable to 
counterattack when they conduct launch operations. Rapid counterbattery attacks by U.S. naval forces 
could prevent these launchers from preparing for another engagement, even if they do not destroy or 
damage the launcher. Once discovered, launchers can then be harassed such that they are unable to sustain 
significant fires. 
A particularly naval example of suppression attacks is in ASW. As in World War II, U.S. surface and 
air forces today could significantly reduce the effectiveness of enemy submarines by using overt ASW 
sensors, such as low frequency active sonar, and inexpensive standoff weapons such as anti-submarine 
rockets. Overt sensors will make submarine commanders less willing to approach the area in which the 
sensor is operating, out of concern for being detected. And being attacked with a standoff ASW weapon, 
even if unsuccessful, will cause a submarine to leave the area because is confirms the submarine was 
detected by ASW forces, and the submarine lacks the speed and self defense capabilities to “stand and 
fight” as a surface combatant might. 
These new concepts could enable naval forces to reduce the ability of the enemy to be effective 
without actually attriting its forces. Instead, these efforts marginalize the enemy and remove them 
temporarily from the fight. Other examples will be explored in the presentation as well, but in general this 
approach offers the potential to improve naval warfighting by focusing capability development on those 
operations that actually accomplish objectives, rather than simply kill the enemy. 
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PANEL 5: MARITIME WARFARE 
COMMANDING TOMORROW’S CONTESTED ZONE: OPERATIONALIZING CS21  
IN THE LITTORALS 
 
Dr. Francis G. Hoffman 
National Defense University 
 
This short paper will focus on the strategic importance of the littorals, a topic frequently overlooked. 
Instead, too often the global commons is accorded strategic status and overemphasized. Command of the 
global commons, is a key enabling element of our larger national strategy. It is important to be able to 
gain control where and when needed, and it should be a critical mission for maritime forces.
1
 But this use 
of the sea, space, and air is NOT the end game of our strategy––it is simply an enabler to achieve larger 
strategic objectives in maintaining international order and access to allies, partners and critical resources. 
Once opened, we must leverage our control of the commons to achieve assigned objectives in the risky 
littorals and the complex terrain and urbanized political centers where political power and centers of 
gravity will congregate. This is where the back half of the A2/AD challenge is too often overlooked. 
Countering the area denial threat is already here and also a growing challenge, in a world in which cheap 
but lethally effective counters can proliferate even faster and much cheaper than modern, long-range anti-
access technologies. It is not an end unto itself, despite thinly veiled attempts to portray it as such.
2
 
While we need to secure control of those commons when we need to, reflecting our Mahanian roots, 
we should not lose sight of the Corbettian notion of exploiting that access for strategic and operational 
maneuver in the Contested Zones.
3
 These zones include the complex and congested littorals where the 
majority of the world’s population, economic activity, energy distribution networks and political power is 
centered.
4
 The requirement to maneuver over the global commons and into these littoral environments has 
been and remains the real extant challenge for U.S. military strategy. Our Nation accrues a number of 
strategic advantages from its relatively robust amphibious projection capacity.
5
 At the end of the day, we 
must ensure our adversaries are not granted impunity in the contested zones where their area denial 
systems and exploitation of the dense complex terrain of the littoral environment presents challenges at the 
operational level in ground expeditionary operations. 
I was asked to apply my research on adaptation to the challenge of preparing for littoral warfare. In 
order to satisfy the chair’s direction, I arranged my presentation in four parts. In the first section, I will 
define and then redefine what is meant today by adaptation. I will then briefly discuss the foundational 
attributes of the U.S. Marine Corps, which I consign responsibility for its remarkable degree of 
adaptability. In the third portion, the paper transitions to a discussion about the adaptations made by the 
Marine Corps represented in the concepts of Operational Maneuver from the Sea and Distributed 
Operations. In my final section, I delineate a few areas where the Corps can continue to adapt in order 
achieve the requisite capabilities for the United States to excel in littoral warfare in the 21
st
 Century. 
 
Adaptation Defined 
The current state of the literature today defines adaptation narrowly. Adaptation is not synonymous with 
innovation or change. Innovation theories are almost entirely focused on major innovative leaps which 
generally occur during peacetime when states and their military institutions have the time and resources to 
                                                 
1 Sam J. Tangredi, Anti-Access Warfare: Countering A2/AD Strategies, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2013. 
2 Barry R. Posen, “Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony,” International Security, Vol. 28, 
No. 1, Summer 2003, pp. 5-46. 
3 Something once stressed in Robert Schmidle and F. G. Hoffman, “Commanding the Contested Zones,” Proceedings, Nov. 2004.   
4 Ralph Peters, “Our Soldiers, Their Cities,” Parameters, Spring 2000, pp. 43-50.  See also David Kilcullen, Out of the 
Mountains, New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2014. 
5 F. G. Hoffman, “21st Century Power Projection,” Marine Corps Gazette December, 2011. 
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explore new technologies and innovative concepts. Innovation studies have focused on rare but significant 
shifts requiring both a new “theory of victory” and the creation or change of a primary combat arm.
6
 
Most theorists, starting with Theo Farrell, head of War Studies at King’s College London, define 
adaptation as something that occurs in wartime. Farrell defined adaptation as a “Change to strategy, force 
generation, and or military plans and operations that is undertaken in response to operational challenges 
and campaign pressures.”
7
 This notion of force generation includes weapons and new equipment, and the 
supporting doctrine. This definition captures the reaction/response character of adaptation that dominates 
the literature. 
Adaptation was shorted during the RMA movement, as it was focused on creating new victory 
mechanisms and new domains. But now, there is a surge of detailed studies about military organizations 
learning and changing based on operational experience.  This includes books by Meir Finkel, Wick 
Murray, James Russell, Janine Davidson, and Chad Serena. 
8
  This rich body of literature has generated a 
greater appreciation for wartime change and the incorporation of inputs from real operational experience 
generated at the edge of the organization at the tactical level. 
In my research “Adaptation is the alteration of existing competencies at either the institutional or 
operational level to enhance performance based on perceived gaps or deficiencies generated by combat 
experience during wartime.”
9
 This involves recognizing or perceiving gaps in performance and the search 
for alterations. A number of adjustments and adaptations may be aggregated into a new organizational 
competency that constitutes an innovation for that organization. Adaptation is a dynamic process 
involving the acquisition of knowledge, the utilization of that knowledge to create altered capacity, and 
the sharing of that learning to other units to integrate and institutionalize the better operational praxis 
across the institution.
10
 Additionally, this definition, per previous scholarship by Grissom incorporates 
“enhanced organizational performance.”
11
 The change continuum and definition also accepts Farrell and 
Terriff’s conception that a bundle of adaptations can lead to the evolution of an aggregate of skills and 
methods that constitute an innovation.
12
 
However, now my definition requires adaptation. We can drop the ‘during wartime’ element to 
include the alteration of core competencies of the institution in response to anticipated changes in 
adversary capabilities or environmental conditions. The rationale for such a definitional change is relevant 
to studying the Marine Corps which has often excelled at anticipatory adaptation in peacetime, reflecting 
its constant evolution of tactics and operational practice within its fundamental mission and core 
competency of amphibious operations. Going back to the 1930s and an equally rich period of history in 
the 1990s, the Marines have a noted ability to learn from the experiences of others, and to recognize the 
need to adapt competencies that the Nation requires of them well before the next crisis. 
Space precludes explaining the attributes that buttress this institutional adaptability of the Corps, but 
it is sufficient to underscore that the Marine culture or ethos is a major element as well as its leadership 
philosophy.
13
 In First to Fight, General Krulak, describes adaptation as “a way of life for the Marines.”
14
 
Commanders articulate a mission and their intent as how this objective contributes to the larger objective. 
                                                 
6 Stephen P. Rosen, Winning the Next War, Innovation and the Modern Military, Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press, 1991, 20–21. 
7 Farrell, “Introduction,” to Theo Farrell, Frans Osinga and James Russell, eds., Military Adaptation in Afghanistan, Stanford, 
CA: Stanford Security Studies, 2013, p. 2. 
8 Meir Finkel, On Flexibility, Recovery from Technological and Doctrinal Surprise on the Battlefield, Stanford, CA: Stanford 
Security Studies, 2011; Williamson Murray, Military Adaptation in War, With Fear of Change, New York: Cambridge Univ. 
Press, 2012; James A. Russell, Innovation, Transformation, and War, Counterinsurgency Operations in Anbar and Ninewa 
Provinces, Iraq, Stanford, CA: Stanford Security Studies, 2011; Chad Serena, A Revolution in Military Adaptation, Washington, 
DC: Georgetown Univ. Press, 2012, pp. 104–119; Janine Davidson, Lifting the Fog of Peace, How Americans Learned to Fight 
Modern War, Ann Arbor: Michigan Univ. Press, 2010.   
9 F. G. Hoffman, Learning Under Fire, Military Change in Wartime, PhD thesis, King’s College London, 2015. 
10 Adapted from Anthony Dibella, Edwin Nevis and Janet Gould, “Understanding Organizational Learning Capability,” Journal 
of Management Studies, 33: 3, October 1996, 363. 
11 Adam Grissom, “The Future of Military Innovation Studies,” Journal of Strategic Studies, 29:5, October 2006, 905–934. 
12 Farrell and Terriff, Military Change, 6.  
13 U.S. Marine Corps, MCDP 1 Warfighting, Quantico, 1997. 
14 Victor Krulak, First to Fight, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1996, 111. 
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Subordinates take in the “what” and why, and are left to their own devices to conceive the “how.”
15
 What 
doctrine the Corps does publish extols the value of “adaptability to respond effectively without a great 
deal of preparation time to a broad variety of circumstances.
16
 Overall, the Marine culture is suited to 
organizational learning and adaptation. It is not a perfect system.
17
 But a penchant for ‘can do’ 
pragmatism, coupled with an institutional bias for action abets continuous inquiry and adaptation in 
peacetime and during war. 
 
Operational Maneuver and Distributed Operations 
Adaptation in littoral and expeditionary operations has been a continuous process within the Marine 
Corps for the last 25 years, despite pressures to execute contingencies across the conflict spectrum. The 
most critical manifestation was the publication of Operational Maneuver from the Sea (OMFTS) in 
1996, and its supporting concept, Ship-to-Objective Maneuver (STOM). These concepts evidence a great 
deal of accurate anticipation about the future operating environment we now take for granted. The 
Marines have evolved the initial concepts of OMFTS and STOM by incorporating distributed operations 
and distributed maneuver. 
Perhaps the most critical adaptation that has been made in the last decade was the eventual 
recognition by the Marine Corps senior leadership about the operational impact of the A2/AD threat as it 
evolved over the last two decades. The Marine Corps should be credited with recognizing the potential 
emergence of A2/AD challenges, particularly the impact of precision munitions back in the 1990s when 
they realized that amphibious operations would have to a) start from greater standoff and b) avoid 
operational pauses at the beach head, which could easily be targeted. These considerations were not 
recognized by most forecasters except by Marine planners back in the 1990s, and they drove the critical 
development of new operational concepts and materiel solutions like the V-22 and the Advanced 
Amphibious Assault Vehicle which was supposed to launch from 25 miles offshore and transit through 
the littorals and seamlessly pass deep into the littoral operating area without days of assembling combat 
power and necessary logistics support. These were recognized as operational weaknesses that could be 
exploited, and this recognition occurred years before anyone coined the A2/AD acronym. 
One can also see further adaptation in the decade long development of Distributed Operations entail 
netted units physically dispersed and operating over an extended battlespace.
18
 This was a concept 
developed by a small cell working for the Commandant that was then deliberately and simultaneously 
placed in the professional journals of the Naval Services to abet professional debate and discourse over 
the implications of these concepts.
19
 Some of the responses were predictable but they were also 
professional and productive.
20
 Distributed Operations are characterized by decentralization, multi-
dimensionality, simultaneity, and continuous pressure over the adversary’s entire system to preclude his 
ability to reconstitute or adjust. Distributed Operations are conducted by squad- to battalion-sized units 
operating as part of a Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF). Units trained and equipped to perform 
Distributed Operations can make a contribution across the full range of military operations from Stability 
and Support Operations to Joint forcible entry missions. 
This concept is consistent with both current trends in conflict and the enduring aspects of the 
operational art. It is particularly oriented on the acute requirements for greater agility, decentralization, 
and multi-dimensionality in future conflict.
21
 Distributed Operations seek to achieve the high degree of 
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operational tempo and fluidity inherent to maneuver warfare. Such operations avoid linear, sequential and 
predictable operations, and extensive reliance on attrition. 
By increasing the ability to simultaneously attack in many directions with all forms of fires and 
maneuver, distributed operations create continuous pressure on the opponent. The resulting relative tempo 
prevents the opponent from adapting or readjusting his force posture or from effectively reconstituting 
capabilities. Continuous pressure degrades the enemy’s overall combat effectiveness, produces paralysis 
or induces systemic collapse. The ultimate aim of any commander is to “implant a picture of defeat in his 
opponent’s mind.”
22
 Continuous pressure, over the breadth of the battlespace, from multiple lines of 
attack, is how the Corps seeks to inject this dim chance for success into the opponent’s mind. 
The combination of these characteristics blinds and disorients the opponent, and produces a sudden 
psychological dislocation when the opponent realizes that his options and assets are declining at an 
accelerating rate. 
The latest iteration of Marine service concepts, in Expeditionary Force 21 (EF 21), sustains the 
original thrust behind distributed operations, particularly in emphasis on the amphibious set of missions.
23
 
This service vision supports the Cooperative Strategy need to: 
 
Conduct sea control and power projection in a more distributed fashion in littoral 
environments. This includes employing forward deployed and surge expeditionary forces 
that are task-organized into a cohesive amphibious force in order to provide scalable 
options to defeat land-based threats, deny enemy use of key terrain, or establish 
expeditionary advance bases and oceanic outposts as described in EF 21.
24
 
 
However, while the Marines got locked into a good solution set for the problem of the 1990s, the 
technological developments required for that solution did not keep pace with emerging threats. Stand-off 
ranges for amphibious operations, stated at 25 miles, were challenged by projected threat abilities to 
identify and strike at the landing force with super-sonic missiles. The requirement for self-deployment 
and seamless transition to maneuver ashore gave the AAAV/EFV dual requirements for water and land 
operations from a single vehicle that drove up both system complexity and costs. The resulting hybrid 
solution, a large vehicle that could plane on the surface at speeds of 25 MPH, was sub optimized for the 
increasingly lethal area denial threat. The program offered an expensive solution to a critical national 
capability, but at $12-15M a copy with extensive O&M costs, it was not seen as cost effective. Even more 
daunting was the limited force protection the vehicle offered, a $15M target for a $150 EFP. Eventually, 
the Marines have realized that they must continue to search for an operationally relevant capability that 
better deals with the ground side of the equation. The Amphibious Combat Vehicle program reflects this 
critical adaptation, as the continued search for creative solutions to support hi-speed and self-deploying 
vehicles.
25
  Marine concepts underscore the greater need for standoff distances of 65 nm, the need for 
distributed maneuver thru multiple penetration points, and critical need for a combination of connectors to 
gain positional advantage in the complex littoral terrain.
26
 
 
Distributed STOVL Operations 
In parallel with this new technology, the Marines are adapting their doctrine and tactics to maximize 
aviation support to the MAGTF via a concept known as Distributed STOVL Ops or DSO. 
27  
 The 
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capability inherent in a STOVL jet allows the Marines to operate in pretty limited or adverse conditions 
and from remote locations where few airfields are available for conventional aircraft. The F-35B supports 
doctrinal maneuver warfare and operational needs for close air support in austere conditions, and it does 
so in the locations our Marines need them the most. The ability to operate from runways of less than 
3,000 feet provides a more than three-fold increase in the number of airfields worldwide that STOVL 
aircraft can use. STOVL aircraft can operate from expeditionary airfields constructed from airfield 
matting or on no airfield infrastructure such as developed roads or even large parking lots. Naturally, the 
Marines have used this flexibility to a degree with the AV-8B Harrier and thus are adapting a skill set 
within a changed environment.  
The foundation of future STOVL operations is the F-35B Joint Strike Fighter executing DSO to exploit 
the agility and multi-faceted capabilities of the 5
th
 Generation jet. DSO is a task-organized MAGTF 
operation employing STOVL aircraft in a distributed force posture, independent of fixed infrastructure, but 
just on a temporary basis. The transitory use of DSO sites mitigates the antiaccess/area denial (A2/AD) 
threat, increasing the sites the opponent has to reconn, reducing the effectiveness of preplanned targeting, 
expanding the possible sites they must strike with G-RAMM systems, and cutting the number of assets at 
risk in each location. 
DSO increases early Phase I deterrence efforts and greatly increases sortie generation rates 
throughout a conflict. The critical component of DSO is having F-35B aircraft launched from a sea or 
land base to conduct multiple missions, with gas, bullets and bombs provided at mobile forward arming 
and refueling points (M-FARPs) located closer to or within the operating area. The planes can return to 
their seabased platforms or use a field on land. In this way, the M-FARPs achieve protection 
incrementally by dispersion, mobility, and deception, while the aircraft operate and rearm outside the 
threat engagement zone. This is certainly not a new competency but it is an extension under new 
circumstances and thus a major adaptation.
28
 
If one needed to wrap up the stream of adaptation over the past generation within the Marine Corps, I 
would summarize it as “the end of the Tarawa Syndrome.” The Marines realize that “hitting the beach” is 
passé but that expeditionary excellence is not. Creating a large beach may be old fashioned but creating 
and defending a lodgment as part of a larger joint campaign may not be.
29
 Adaptation, to both new 
opportunities and to evolving threats has been the order of the decade, despite the necessary application of 
the Marine Corps in two protracted counterinsurgencies. 
 
Additional Amphibious Adaptations 
The Marines need to extend their work to adapt to 21
st
 Century challenges, and the following section 
details areas where particular payoff can be garnered. 
30
 
 
Robotics and Unmanned Systems 
The Marine Corps is not new to UAS, having been the first U.S. military service to acquire Remotely 
Piloted Vehicles for intelligence and surveillance tasks in the 1980s from Israel. The MCWL has 
maintained an active experimental effort in small and micro-UAVs for decades, and the Marines have been 
at the forefront of the use of both unmanned ground vehicles for detecting mines and in the use of UAVs 
for logistics.
31
 That said, much more can be done in the employment of UAVs for long loiter fire support to 
distributed ground units as captured in operating concepts going back for over a decade now. The Marines 
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may have been the first to employ UAS, at the direction of civilian leaders. But they emphasized 
intelligence and logistics over fire support. 
Additionally, there is a lot of potential in UUV for countering mines in shallow waters, and there is 
an additional rich vein of unexploited combat power in unmanned combat breaching systems. For 
example, many existing Amphibious Tractors could be converted to Autonomous or Remotely Operated 
Assault Breaches. The first wave that hits the beach in a truly contested landing in the next war should 
be completely unmanned, but capable of conducted beach reconnaissance, mine clearing, and 
suppressive fires. 
32
 
There is also a lot of potentially in applying Marine lessons in UAV Logistics to robotic surface 
vehicles to deliver combat service support from shipping directly to the landing area. A swarming 
logistics train is a feasible concept.
33
 
 
Exo-Skeleton Capabilities 
A natural transition from purely unmanned system is the employment of human performance 
augmentation from exo-skeleton technologies.
34
 The use of lower body exo sets could be a huge 
advantage to ground units in certain operational contexts. I can think of two major scenarios where this 
technology could be immediately useful; in reconnaissance teams and in urban operations. 
Strategic Reconnaissance Teams capable of deep interdiction operations with heavier loads, over 
longer periods of time, and over rough terrain. Using the load bearing capacity of the emerging Lower 
Extremity model, a strategic reconnaissance team could be inserted much further from its objective area 
to preclude detection during insertion. With the additional endurance and mobility afforded by the system 
the team could travel further and farther, without tiring the team when it arrives at a hide site. A special 
operations unit could carry more mission equipment or more rapidly transit an austere area or complex 
terrain than is possible today. With the inherent load capacity of the system, the team could lengthen 
mission performance periods, enhance mission capability with added systems, and preclude the need for 
additional logistics resupply that might compromise the team’s position. 
Another option is the design and fielding of urban combat teams capable of bringing heavy weapons, 
more munitions, and self-powered breaching or surveillance systems to city fighting. Exoskeleton clad 
teams could bring more firepower, greater mobility enhancing systems, and highly advanced force 
protection/body armor systems to bear than current infantry units. Exo-skeleton-clad teams could use the 
power of the system’s energy pack to operate weapons for creating holes in walls, clearing rooms, or 
employing scalable lethal and less than lethal fires. Such teams could include designated team members 
with different versions of the suit for various roles with an urban fighting unit. Some members could use 
the technology to carry significantly increased forms of body armor. Other team members could be heavy 
weapons operators, or breachers, and others could carry additional munitions for the gunners. The capacity 
of such teams to rapidly penetrate into urban gaps, employ firepower, and maintain the momentum of the 
attack may preclude the traditional difficulties of dangerous and predictable room clearing. The Battle for 
Fallujah might have been an entirely different affairs with exoskeleton supported fighters.
35
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Expeditionary Power 
Another area where the Marines have excelled in adaptation is in exploring expeditionary power sources. 
This line of operational experimentation has delivered results, especially in Afghanistan to date. 
Technological developments in this field will produce more power, greater flexibility in operations, and 
lessen the load on tactical units in maneuver. All naval forces will benefit ultimately from advances in 
power generation, but the tip of the tactical spear should not be overlooked. One can envision better 
power sources improving C2, intelligence, and logistic burdens, but we should not overlook potential 
advances in firepower as well. We can expect further advances in this area which will hopefully increase 
combat effectiveness and efficiency, while minimizing the exposure of human and material resources in 
support tasks and sustainment.
36
 
 
Counter-G-RAMM 
Finally, future Marine Air-Ground Task Forces may no longer have complete air superiority against 
cheap, low flying drones and other Guided-Rocket, Artillery, Missiles and Mortars. Tomorrow’s 
improvised explosive devices may not be strewn along the ground, instead they could be IEMs or 
Intelligent Explosive Munitions delivered by small drones with target recognition technologies. They may 
also be highly precise fires placed on Marine units. Such forces may need to both control their signatures 
and generate decoys and have layered defenses against such systems.
37
 
 
Conclusion 
In wrapping up, it should be evident that our national security interests require us to do more than 
“command the commons.” The Joint warfighting community recognized the importance of these 
operations when it put forward the Joint Concept for Entry Operations.
38
 The establishment of sea control 
as the foundation for power projection is a priority, and the strategic advantages of exploiting sea-based 
maneuver must be preserved and extended to our projected security environment.
39
 Tomorrow’s threats 
are larger, more adaptive, and have greater access to technology than in the past. 
40
 
Our assumptions about uncontested access to critical domains are now outdated. We no longer have a 
monopoly over access to this great highways of the oceans and we need to break down what Tangredi 
called “the great walls” that seek to put our strategic freedom of action at risk.
41
 Thus, we need to counter 
the emergent anti-access problem as suggested in the extensions beyond Air-Sea Battle.
42
 We should not 
forget that the purpose of maneuvering thru the commons was eventually to be able to successfully 
maneuver into and achieve assigned political objectives in the risky Contested Zones. Our policy masters 
will eventually expect us to contest for control over those dense physical spaces where populations live, 
financial institutions have assets, political governance is situated, and where transportation, 
telecommunications and energy networks converge. To advance and secure our nation’s interests, we must 
master the chaos and ambiguity of the Contested Zones in the littorals. That is where future fights will be 
won or lost, and now is the time to begin adapting to that reality. 
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PANEL 5: MARITIME WARFARE 
FUTURE MARITIME FORCES: UNMANNED, AUTONOMOUS, AND LETHAL  
 
Dr. William F. Bundy 
U.S. Naval War College 
 
Vice Admiral Thomas Rowden is leading the U.S. Navy Surface Force towards a transformation into an 
offense fighting force through the development and realization of the Distributed Lethality concept. His 
vision is to deploy a surface force that has offensive capability in every ship in the Navy. Vice Admiral 
Rowden's vision is to create and maintain credible combat power as a strategic deterrence to aggression 
throughout the global maritime domain. 
Distributed lethality represents a significant operational concept that will ultimately extend across the 
U.S. Navy combat force. This of course is an evolving capability based on ships that are in the fleet today 
and those that are expected to follow through the shipbuilding program over the next 30 years. 
At the same time, the Deputy Assistant Secretary the Navy for Unmanned Systems, Frank Kelly, is 
advancing a program to develop unmanned air, surface and undersea vehicles with the possibility of those 
vehicles being deployed as semi- and fully-autonomous assets. Unmanned systems have the potential to 
deliver capabilities that are now delivered by major combatants, aircraft and submarines. 
The combination of Distributed Lethality and unmanned systems has the potential for revolutionizing 
maritime warfare. Imagine if you will the arrival of USS BAINBRIDGE DDG 2001 in the South China 
Sea to execute a routine maritime patrol in July 2045. 
 
On Patrol in the South China Sea - July 2045 
USS BAINBRIDGE DDG 2001 is underway in the South China Sea on maritime security patrol. 
BAINBRIDGE's mission is sea surveillance and maritime security operations that are designed to 
maintain free access to the maritime commons. Operating 90 miles south of Fiery Cross Island, a People's 
Republic of China maritime security base, BAINBRIDGE has deployed three unmanned combat patrol 
surface vessels, an unmanned aircraft patrol consisting of three armed airships, and two unmanned 
submarines to extend the surveillance coverage of the ship. 
In mission control, operators are monitoring communications and data links from their fully-
autonomous ships and aircraft that have been programmed to conduct maritime patrols under mission 
orders and decision-making control functions that are bounded by prudent navigation, territorial 
restrictions and rules of engagement. BAINBRIDGE's unmanned patrols have the technology to sense the 
environment, detect and track aircraft and vessels, and report their operating pictures to BAINBRIDGE 
via system-to-system networks that create an overall operating picture of the battlespace. 
BAINBRIDGE's patrol ships and aircraft have been assigned areas to conduct surveillance and are 
expected to execute mission orders that direct their actions based on the current security environment. 
Rather than remotely control BAINBRIDGE's unmanned air and surface patrols, advances in intelligent 
agent-technology have produced assurances that each of the ships and aircraft will operate within the 
rules of safe flight and navigation as well as laws that respect territorial limits and exercise freedom of 
navigation. Intelligent agent-technology combined with sensor and decision-making capabilities enable 
BAINBRIDGE's patrols to operate in semi-autonomous and fully-autonomous modes of operation. 
Developing, testing and employing intelligent control systems in unmanned ships and aircraft will be 
a major step forward in the acceptance of fully-autonomous fleet elements. In the past, ships and maritime 
patrols were commanded solely by humans. Those captains and flight leaders were required to exercise 
initiative and judgment in executing their missions. They were all educated, trained and experienced in 
their positions as operational leader. They often made subjective decisions based on incomplete 
information and tensions that involved executing the mission while avoiding risk and possible untoward 
incidents or collateral damage in combat situations. 
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The challenge between now and 2045 is to develop technology that will advance artificial intelligence 
to a point where commanders can be assured that autonomous systems will make "decisions" that 
conform to safety of flight and navigation and ultimately the laws of armed conflict. This is a vision of 
course, but a vision that seems within reach for the Navy. Deploying unmanned fully-autonomous ships, 
aircraft and submarines across the maritime domain would revolutionize maritime warfare. 
 
Advancing Maritime Unmanned Systems 
During a recent conference on maritime unmanned systems, experts including scientists, technologists, 
Navy program managers and war fighters presented arguments for employment of unmanned remotely-
controlled, semi-autonomous and fully-autonomous air, surface and undersea vehicles. There was 
optimism during the conference with a note of caution concerning the limits to which commanders 
would be assured that "machines" would exercise the necessary behaviors to meet missions beyond 
simple surveillance and reconnaissance. The idea of unmanned systems with the capability of 
performing detect-to-engage operations was a point a repeated discussion. 
The acceptance of semi-autonomous and fully-autonomous fleet elements is predicated on the 
reliability, surety and successful testing of sensor to processor to control functions in unmanned ships 
and aircraft. The persistent question was would unmanned systems adhere to safe navigation, safety of 
flight and the laws of armed conflict while executing "assigned" maritime missions ordered by operators 
and commanders. 
The Department of Defense has published guidance on the design, development, construction and 
intended operation of unmanned systems. That guidance requires system controls and functions that 
enable commanders and operators to maintain control of unmanned systems through the range of 
military operations. 
Our question for discussion is: Can innovative thinkers in our defense or federal laboratories, 
industry research and development centers, and/or warfare centers create unmanned systems that can 
operate as part of the fleet and deliver on the vision of autonomous operations? 
This is an urgent question and necessary quest because our competitors are catching up with us on 
the evolution of unmanned systems. Just recently, an article published in the National Interest magazine 
reported on Russian efforts to advance underwater spy drones. Dave Majumdar reported: 
 
Russia is developing a family of unmanned surface and underwater vehicles, a high-
ranking official in that country’s navy said this week. While the U.S. Navy has been 
developing naval drones for more than a decade, this is the first indication that Moscow 
is working on similar capabilities. 
“Work will be continued in 2016 to develop unmanned boats that can be based both on 
ships and on the shore,” Vice Adm. Alexander Fedotenkov, deputy commander-in-chief 
of the Russian Navy told the TASS news agency on Jan. 21.  
(Russia vs. America: The Race for Underwater Spy Drones, Dave Majumdar, the 
National Interest, Jan 21, 2016) 
 
Our U.S. Navy fleet evolution and structure question points to the need to continue and possibly 
accelerate research and development on unmanned systems less we allow near-peer competitors to close 
the gap and take away our existing advantage. 
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PANEL 5: MARITIME WARFARE 
THE PRISM OF CLASSICAL NAVAL STRATEGY: ANOTHER PERSPECTIVE ON JAM-GC AND 
21ST CENTURY OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS  
 
CDR Benjamin “BJ” Armstrong, U.S. Navy 
PhD candidate, King’s College London 
 
In March 2015 the Chief of Naval Operations, in cooperation with the Commandants of the Marine Corps and 
Coast Guard, released the sea services’ new strategic document The Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century 
Seapower. The document encourages sailors, marines, guardsmen, and navalists to understand strategy and to 
think strategically. However, despite that direction, the dialogue that has loomed largest in the naval sphere 
over the past several years has not been strategy at all, but instead debate about an operational concept.  First 
as Air-Sea Battle, and now as the Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons or JAM-
GC, this operational thinking has been the center of naval discourse, with a multitude of writings, panels, and 
lectures from its developers, supporters, and opponents. In the back and forth we have been introduced to 
Offshore Control and Joint Operational Access as well.
1
  
How the United States military and allied navies counter attempts at Anti-Access and Area-Denial has 
very important tactical and operational ramifications for the future of the force. However, it is also important to 
place the dialogue on operational concepts and operational thinking within strategic context. Strategy is about 
making choices and designing efforts to achieve national objectives. Debate that attempts to derive a consensus 
on a single operational concept removes choices, and removes the ability to participate in the art of naval 
strategy. Therefore, it is important that we make an effort to place analysis of counter-A2AD operating 
concepts within a larger discussion of strategy, one rooted in the classical concepts of naval warfare. 
 
The Framework of Naval Strategy 
The underlying ideas behind concepts like JAM-GC, Offshore Control, and Joint Operational Access, when 
examined through lens of strategy, can help us avoid the funhouse mirror of budget policy and administrative 
maneuvering in the Pentagon. Yet, even with the volume of writing on naval operations in the last decade, 
articles have tended to lack a genuine engagement with the concepts and structures in the classical naval 
theory. A careful reading of many of the articles on this subject, and a detailed consideration of their footnotes, 
frequently offers readers the conclusion that this dialogue has been divorced from the actual thinking, writing, 
and theory of naval strategy.
2
 
As Bernard Brodie once wrote, “contrary to popular belief, there is nothing especially esoteric about the 
basic principles of warfare.”
3
 From the works of Mahan, Corbett, and Castex, and elucidation of others like 
Brodie and Rosinski, we have the foundational idea that naval warfare begins with the question of command of 
the sea. But command of the sea is generally insufficient except in the most theoretical form of naval war. The 
classical strategists all agreed that while it may be possible, and was the best case scenario, it was unlikely that 
establishing command would be enough to force the political objective desired. The enemy gets a vote, and 
rarely gives up easily. As a result, there had to be a next step in a naval strategy, a step where the control that 
command of sea offered was exercised.  To put it as simply as possible, the exercise of this control is achieved 
by using the "3 B's" or blockade, bombardment, or putting boots on the ground. This is what led Corbett to his 
famous but often misrepresented dictum that “in no case can we exercise control by battleships alone.”
4
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Today's discussions tend to ignore these foundations entirely. However, when the lens of classical naval 
strategy is used to view the challenge of obtaining a strategic outcome in an A2AD environment, the 
operational concepts highlighted over the past two or three years begin to fall into place. When reduced to the 
basics, is not JAM-GC a discussion of establishing command of the sea in a modern A2AD environment? By 
extension, Offshore Control is our 21st century concept of an East Asian blockade, the CSBA vision of AirSea 
Battle has a certain focus on bombardment, and Expeditionary Force 21 and Joint Operational Access Concept 
are about putting boots on the ground. By placing these operational concepts within a framework that starts 
with strategy, instead of tactics and technology, we gain a different view.
5
 
 
Strategic Practice v. Operational Planning 
Establishing command of the sea and exercising the control allowed by that command through blockade, 
bombardment, or putting boots on the ground, is a simplified way of looking at the basics of naval strategy. 
Admittedly, from this brief discussion these principles appear sequential but that is not actually the case. 
They are simply building blocks of naval warfare and can be put together in an almost infinite number of 
ways. Mahan described the conduct of war as an art, writing: “art, out of materials which it finds about it, 
[it] creates new forms in endless variety...according to the genius of the artist and the temper of materials 
with which he is dealing.”
6
   
Understanding how to combine these elements of naval warfare is the central task of naval strategy. Each 
has its own temporal and geographic elements in play as well as a moving scale of totality. Despite what recent 
writing on naval affairs tells us, the individual operational parts should not be considered strategies by 
themselves or in isolation. Instead, if a navy’s fleet and resources are its means these should be the ways in 
which a strategist employs them in order to achieve the political ends desired by the conflict. Thus, localized 
command of the sea may be all that a naval force can accomplish, but it also may be sufficient to achieve the 
operational objectives desired, or needed, for the political result. Command might also only be established for 
a very specific period of time. As John Hattendorf has written, “there are gradations that range from an abstract 
ideal to that which is practical, possible, or merely desirable...control is to be general or limited, absolute or 
merely governing, widespread or local, permanent or temporary.”
7
  
What tends to be lost when we focus on the individual operational concepts, or the specific tactical 
challenges of an A2AD network, is a larger strategic view. We must remember that the scaling of the principles 
of naval warfare, and their combination into a method by which the naval strategist hopes to achieve his 
nation’s goals, is the heart of the task, not just the tactical employment of technology for kinetic effect. These 
are some of the fundamentals we should be discussing when considering the doctrinal and operational writing 
of maritime affairs in the 21st century.
8
 
 
Using Another Lens 
As Captain Haynes ably demonstrated in his recent book Toward a New Maritime Strategy, we navalists tend 
to be very comfortable engaging in the discussion of how new technologies and new tactics fit into new 
operational concepts but that doesn't mean we extend that comfort to strategy.
9
 We recognize how multiple 
tactics and multiple technologies can be combined for synergy into an effective operational ideal. But taking 
the next step, viewing strategy in a similar way and exercising the art of combining different operational 
concepts to achieve the nation's objectives, we tend to falter. We must always include this element of the 
discussion. Just as we always look "downward" to the development of new weapons and technology, our 
discussions must also look "upward" to how they contribute to strategy. Use of and understanding of the 
established frameworks of naval strategy will help us take the bearings we need to better chart our course. 
                                                 
5 T.X. Hammes, “Offshore Control: A Proposed Strategy,” Infinity Journal, Vol. 2, No. 2, Spring 2012, pp. 10-14.  Jan Van Tol, 
et al, “Air Sea Battle: A Point-of-Departure Operational Concept,” (Washington D.C.: The Center for Strategic and Budgetary 
Assessments, 2010).  U.S. Marine Corps, “Expeditionary Force 21: Forward and Ready, Now and in the Future,” (Washington, 
D.C.: Department of the Navy, 2014). 
6 Alfred Thayer Mahan, Naval Strategy: Compared and Contrasted with the Principles and Practice of Military Operations on 
Land (1911, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1975), p. 299. 
7 John B. Hattendorf, Naval History and Maritime Strategy: Collected Essays (Malabar, FL: Krieger Publishing, 2000), p. 236. 
8 Brodie, p. 14. 
9 Peter Haynes, Toward a New Maritime Strategy (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2015). 
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PANEL 6: HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND DISASTER RELIEF 
ADVANCING THE U.S. SEA SERVICES’ CAPACITY TO RESPOND TO URBAN 
HUMANITARIAN DISASTERS AND COMPLEX EMERGENCIES 
 
Dr. Michael D. Lappi 
Harvard Humanitarian Initiative 
 
The role of the United States Sea Services during Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response 
(HADR) events will become a critical component of international relief efforts in an era of increasing 
global warming and coastal urbanization. Core amphibious operational capabilities and the ability to 
remain fully self-supporting during prolonged crises will provide an unparalleled opportunity to influence 
lifesaving efforts on a global scale. However, the ability to fully utilize the immense capability of the U.S. 
Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard team requires continued emphasis on coordination with civilian 
counterparts as well as a renewed appreciation for the mastery of the core guiding principles required 
during these complex relief operations. With millions of lives potentially in the balance, it is imperative 
for the Sea Services to expand education, training, and partnership focused exercises and simulations in 
order to fully realize the potential of the fleet. 
Coastal urbanization is a critical vulnerability throughout the globe and comprises a significant region 
of risk encompassed by U.S. Sea Service operations. Littoral and amphibious operations to address the 
emergent needs of these areas has been demonstrated in recent years to be not a matter of determining “if” 
it will happen, but a question of “when” it will happen. Operations within these coastal regions can be 
considered most hazardous in countries already plagued with poor infrastructure, growing population, and 
sparse job opportunities. Migration towards coastal regions typically supporting port or other seafaring 
activities can dramatically impact the natural protections afforded by marshland and rugged vegetation as 
areas are cleared for housing, subsistence activities, or port development. These dramatic perturbations in 
the natural ecosystem can be further enhanced by failures to manage human waste and free flowing 
waterways. In this setting, urbanization can result in concentric ecosystems of poverty, poor education, 
criminal activity, and decaying societal values unless fully managed by a competent and effective national 
system of governance. Without this strong national leadership, the focus on infrastructure development 
and maintenance as well as the protection of the population become secondary to the daily management 
of crises. Even small perturbations in weather, environment, disease management, or an infrequent 
catastrophic event can cripple the patchwork support network of the community. Without this marginal 
support, humanitarian activities become mired in community level chaos as dysfunctional organizations 
and counter-productive management interrupt the flow of recovery personnel and supplies. It is within 
this potentially cataclysmic region that the U.S. Sea Services will be expected to execute sustained and 
highly efficient operations. 
Key to the creation of a competent and highly resourceful U.S. Sea Service response is the 
development of an educational system fully prepared to meet the leadership and operational demands of 
this dynamic environment. Embracing the spirit of the Oslo Guidelines and in particular the concept of 
“resource of last resort,” U.S. military leaders must fully comprehend the impact of employing military 
personnel, equipment, and capabilities into existing humanitarian community actions during crisis 
response efforts. While military operations can easily overrun a region, it is the measured employment of 
critical assets in coordination with civilian responders that will dramatically impact the overall response. 
Areas of particular emphasis for educational endeavors include security cooperation, coordination and 
integration of logistics (including integrated airlift capability), heavy equipment and construction 
operations, internally displaced personnel and refugee management, the revolution in information 
communications technologies used to assess and manage crises, Sphere Standards, and the basics of the 
UN cluster systems. 
Equally important to comprehensive education is the implementation of intense training programs 
that emphasize the critical military capabilities that cannot be easily replicated by civilian organizations. 
Core training leading to expertise in mass casualty response, high intensity and sustained logistics, and 
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more effective command and control functions provide the opportunity to create the framework for 
concurrent or follow-on life saving operations. These functions, while practiced outside of strictly 
military organizations, are ingrained in military operations and married to the stress and horrors of battle 
that can also be expected during critical or catastrophic disaster and complex emergency response events. 
More importantly, the presence of experienced military personnel that consider these operations as an 
accepted duty and responsibility will provide an opportunity for daily mentorship to junior personnel and 
the backbone of a sustained community. Collectively, this cadre of experts develops a persistent and 
resilient force capable of adapting to the intense variability of rescue operations. 
Finally, education and training programs, while of vital importance to HADR operations, are of 
secondary importance to the necessity for partnership with the humanitarian relief community. The 
benefits of inclusive education and training programs that consider the value of partnerships, and 
develops the network, relationships, and camaraderie required for sustained operations is the true future 
opportunity for success. A deeper understanding for the people, processes, and governing thought within 
the humanitarian community creates the foundation of an integrated and intelligent relief system that is 
significantly more responsive, flexible, and agile than current efforts. These partnerships can and should 
be nurtured through routine and periodic exchange programs, combined exercises, and collective planning 
activities that allow organizations with differing cultures and structures to learn to work together. 
 
Conclusion 
Despite the fact that HADR is currently prioritized twelfth out of twelve U.S. military missions in the 
2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, it is the one crisis mission area that we definitively know will be 
executed on a routine basis. The relatively low cost of increasing and improving current education, 
training, and partnership opportunities is a critical investment in the future success of the U.S. Sea 
Services. Greater attention to these areas will ensure the professional execution of these critical 
lifesaving missions in increasingly complex urban environments as well as during complex emergencies 
for decades to come. 
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PANEL 6: HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND DISASTER RELIEF 
THE URBAN DILEMMA IN CIVIL-MILITARY HUMANITARIAN COORDINATION 
 
Dr. Ronak B. Patel 
Stanford University School of Medicine 
 
The humanitarian sector faces new challenges and opportunities due to urbanization, new manifestations of 
violence and their accompanying protection mandates and a growing number of stakeholders. Militaries 
coordinating in humanitarian response must also adapt to this new environment. 
The trend that cannot be ignored or reversed and will clearly define the environment for future 
humanitarian activities and thus, military coordination, is that of urbanization. Military operations in 
support of humanitarian missions will increasingly take place in cities. Rapid urbanization means that the 
urban population with grow to over 66% by 2050 while the rural population shrinks
1
. At present, 3 million 
people move to cities every week
2
. These urban centers also concentrate risks and hazards to crisis 
compounding the likelihood of urban based crisis and response. Humanitarian crises also drive 
displacement into cities as the portion of refugees now living in urban areas is over 59% and growing
3
. As 
such, the ground in which militaries engaged in supporting humanitarian missions is shifting into 
increasingly complex environments with a multitude of challenges. 
Conflict induced humanitarian crises that trigger military coordination make urban crises even more 
likely. Power is still reliant on territorial control and cities represent the most valuable territory in modern 
states. Cities may become the central battleground as both seats of power and conflict over power. As 
violence is no longer the monopoly of the state and their militaries (bound by international humanitarian 
law), the growing number and variety of actors (unbound by international humanitarian law) in urban 
crises that can influence security will make missions more complex. 
Most importantly, urban crises involve a wider variety of civil actors beyond the traditional 
international aid agencies, state authorities and national militaries. These new urban landscapes have a 
multitude of stakeholders that may need to be engaged in coordination efforts or at least addressed as a 
powerbroker or threat to the mission. They include local municipal authorities that now often lead and 
coordinate the response, community based organizations as well as local charities that may participate in a 
bulk of the effort on the ground, the private sector supplying a broader range of goods and services, 
militarized police and private security forces that have been present before the crisis and extremely violent 
and competing gangs with de facto territorial control. Understanding who these actors are, their role, power 
relations, capacity and legitimacy can be difficult and requires a deeper understanding of context. 
Humanitarian organizations themselves find this process challenging when arriving to an urban crisis and 
do not yet have industry wide formalized methods of rapidly assessing these multitude of stakeholders. 
The latest trend and recommendation for humanitarian action in urban crisis, codified within the Urban 
Charter to be released for the upcoming World Humanitarian Summit, is to promote area-based 
programming (ABP). This type of humanitarian operation emphasizes a more localized and holistic 
approach to crisis response with a detailed understanding of the local context to drive operations that are 
community-based to ensure appropriateness and sustainability. This approach requires a more inclusive 
approach than the current cluster system allows by taking into account the wider array of civil society 
actors and stakeholders. Militaries supporting humanitarian missions or providing peacekeeping and 
security for such operations must also face this range of actors. 
Additionally, the geography and density of these growing urban landscapers make them operationally 
challenging. Many of these rapidly growing cities are marked by large urban slums that make up over 
                                                 
1 United Nations. World Urbanization Prospects 2014: United Nations Publications, 2014. 
2 International Organization of Migration. World Migration Report 2015. IOM, 2015. Available at https://www.iom.int/world-
migration-report-2015 
3 Crawford, N, J Cosgrave, S Haysom and N Walicki (2015), Protracted displacement: uncertain paths to self-reliance in exile, 
Overseas Development Institute, London. 
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50% of cities in some cases. At baseline urban slums prove very difficult, if not impossible, to police. 
They are often completely unmapped areas - difficult to traverse, marked by narrow alleys and footpaths 
without any formal roads, signs or lighting and remain largely unfamiliar to non-residents. Even police in 
many of these cities do not venture into these areas due to their unfamiliarity and gang control.  
The urban violence that marks many cities is also an emerging challenge even in “non-conflict” 
disasters (e.g. an earthquake in San Pedro Sula, Honduras) as baseline rates of violence resemble or 
surpass declared wars and local capacity or willingness to address it remains weak
4
. The German 
Intelligence Agency, in their document on “Ungovernable Megacities,” asserted, “Mumbai, Mexico City 
and Jakarta are only partially able to carry out their original core responsibilities of protecting their 
population from violence and destabilization.
5
” Taking on a protection mission into such a scenario for 
the local population or the humanitarian actors themselves presents a new challenge for militaries. Safety 
for humanitarian staff is difficult to ensure as the situation on the ground can be fluid with information 
(and rumors) spreading rapidly and territorial control often in flux. 
Moving forward, a new model of civil-military humanitarian coordination may be required. The 
principles guiding this will undoubtedly require closer communication. While humanitarian 
communication has become more open with mapping (e.g. crisis-mappers) and information sharing 
platforms. Military communication systems, by their very nature, are private. A new platform may be 
required that allows better communication at some level between civil society actors and the military. 
This may be limited to higher levels with the U.S. Agency for International Development’s Office for 
Foreign Disaster Assistance or other international humanitarian architecture but a new platform will likely 
be required to share the detailed and context specific information required in urban crises and specifically 
area based programming. Humanitarian actors may also have to align closer to the military for the sake of 
security at the cost of some neutrality if hoping to reach beneficiaries in cities characterized by the type of 
urban violence described above. It may be that humanitarian and military actors work hand-in-hand in 
certain cases rather than in a supporting role. Finally, both humanitarian and military communities would 
be better served learning about and exploring coordination together with joint training and workshops, 
collaboration on research and innovating technology together. While the characteristics of new civ-mil 
relationships can be described, implementing a new operational framework is far off. Yet future crises 
will necessitate innovative approaches and evolve new patterns of civil-military cooperation on the 
ground that may run ahead of any pre-defined strategy. It is imperative to urgently explore new 
frameworks and methods for civil-military coordination to keep pace with the changing environment. 
                                                 
4 Wainer, Andrew. Worse than War, El Salvador’s Youth Caught in Web of Violence. The Hill blog. August 3, 2015. Available at 
http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/249969-worse-than-war-el-salvadors-youth-caught-in-web-of. 
5 Chirol. Ungoverned Megacities. ComingAnarchy.com. 3 Nov. 2007. Available at 
http://cominganarchy.com/2007/11/03/ungoverned-megacities. 
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PANEL 6: HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND DISASTER RELIEF 
STRATEGIC SURPRISE AND CLIMATE CHANGE SUPPORT STRATEGIES 
 
Dr. Joseph DiRenzo III 
U.S. Coast Guard Research and Development Center 
 
The lessons learned are many just in the past two decades. 
In July 1997 it was the explosion of the Soufriere Hills volcano in Montserrat, West Indies; in 2006 it 
was Hurricane Katrina along America’s Gulf Coast; in 2010 it was the Haitian Earthquake; and in 2013 it 
was Typhoon Haiyan, also known as Super Typhoon Yolanda.  What do all these events have in common? 
Maritime units, from the U.S Coast Guard, the U.S. Navy and other NATO nations were deeply involved 
in providing humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) in an urban setting. Each is unique in that 
response was modified for the event itself. However, they collectively offer a perfect set of examples to 
look for patterns, successful response protocols. 
The devastation incurred by each of these events is significant. Take Typhoon Haiyan for example, 
according to UNICEF, “Typhoon Haiyan, one of the most powerful tropical storms on record, caused 
tremendous damage when it made landfall in the Philippines in November 2013. More than 6,000 people 
were killed. Thousands of homes were destroyed. Over 14 million Filipinos, including nearly 6 million 
children, were affected”.
1
 
The predicted impact of future events will have on coastal urban areas will be exasperated by climate 
change, especially with the expected rise in sea levels. This rise is projected all over the world. Use the 
Norfolk Virginia area as an example, home to the Navy’s largest homeport. According to the Washington 
Post, normal tides have risen 1 ½ feet over the past decade.
2
 The same article re-enforced that by the end 
of the century the sea level would rise 5 ½ feet. The Post article also noted in a “worst case scenario” with 
rapid melting of the earth’s glaciers and ice caps that the rise would be over 8 foot. Now, is this science 
exact – no. Are there major detractors in and out of academia – yes. But all the maritime forces within the 
United States and NATO would be foolish to simply avoid this issue. 
In addition to the rise in sea levels populations have been flocking to the coastal zone to both live and 
work. This has added to the concern for one simple reason. As you increase a population along a 
seaboard, you increase the urbanization of that area. Look at the growth experienced along Long Island 
sound as just one example. According to the 2007 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Working 
Group report, “Coastal population growth in many of the world’s deltas, barrier islands and estuaries has 
led to widespread conversion of natural coastal landscapes to agriculture, aquaculture, silviculture, as well 
as industrial and residential uses.” 
3
 It has been estimated that 23 percent of the world’s population lives 
both within 100 km distance of the coast and <100 m above sea level, and population densities in coastal 
regions are about three times higher than the global average”.
4
 This shift will exacerbate a fundamental 
contingency planning consideration as maritime staffs consider threat vectors. More people will be 
concentrated in smaller areas. The challenge in a Humanitarian Assistance Disaster Response (HA/DR) 
response scenario just got even more difficult because as a rapid growth in the population occurs along 
the coast, coupled with a desire for more and more infrastructure and a rise in sea level you suddenly have 
“Perfect Storm Scenario” that when impacted by an significant event, such as an earthquake, requiring a 
maritime HA/DR response the result could be quite over-whelming. Due to the possibility of cascading 
events maritime forces should continue to refine their doctrine, strategy and Tactics, Techniques and 
                                                 
1 UNICEF (2013) Hurricane Relief – Philippines Typhoon Haiyan, 
https://www.unicefusa.org/mission/emergencies/hurricanes/2013-philippines-typhoon-haiyan 
2 Lori Montgomery (2014, May 31), In Norfolk, evidence of climate change is in the streets at high tide The Washington Post, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/in-norfolk-evidence-of-climate-change-is-in-the-streets-at-high-
tide/2014/05/31/fe3ae860-e71f-11e3-8f90-73e071f3d637_story.html 
3 Valiela, I., (2006): Global Coastal Change. Blackwell, Oxford, 368 pp. 
4 Small, C., and R.J. Nicholls, (2003) A global analysis of human settlement in coastal zones. J. Coastal Res., 19, 584-599. 
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Procedures (TTP) to account for these new realities. The response in an urban environment in 2050 will 
not be what it is today. 
So what approach could be taken by contingency planners and tacticians alike to prepare for the “new 
reality”? What events or combination of events could trigger such a need for an HA/DR response? Can 
thinking about scenarios that comprise strategic surprise events be used to frame the planning process? 
Consider this scenario, which has been widely reported by the international media, the 2000 BBC story 
“Mega-tsunami: Wave of Destruction”. 
5
 The BBC story reported about growing concern of a “geological 
time-bombs” around the world which once “triggered” would generate a significant tsunami like event. 
The report centered around the island of La Palma in the Canary Island, off north Africa and a future 
eruption would unleash a massive landside on the western side of the island. 
Based on the BBC’s reporting a major landslide event on La Palma would set up a tsunami which 
would “race across the Atlantic at the speed of an airliner”. The report goes on to note that the tsunami’s 
impact on Boston would be significant along with other locations along the east coast. This would trigger 
a significant response by U.S. Northern Command and the DoD….think Super Storm Sandy x10. Now 
apply this scenario to other parts of the world, because if you believe the BBC report, and I do, the impact 
will be significant. There are possible “strategic surprise events” around the world. 
Additionally, armed with this information you need to ask yourself --- How well prepared are the 
maritime services to respond, especially in an urban environment? What lessons specifically from 
Typhoon Haiyan and the Haitian earthquake apply here? Has any agency, including NORTHCOM or 
other geographic combatant commanders considered this type of scenario as a strategic surprise? What 
role do the maritime forces play in a whole of government response? 
 
What do I mean by a strategic Surprise? 
In their essay “Ahead of The Curve: Anticipating Strategic Surprise,” researchers Peter Schwartz and 
Doug Randall noted that a strategic surprise differ from a “run of the mill surprise” in that it produces 
significant organization and societal impacts, challenges conventional wisdom, and is hard to imagine.
6
  
In the case of La Palma, using the variables above could thinking about this kind of HA/DR response 
in the context of a Strategic Surprise be valuable? First, would this type of event produce “significant 
organization and societal impacts” – the short answer is yes based on the literature. Second, does this 
scenario challenge conventional wisdom? Again…looking at the literature there is a great deal of 
skepticism that this would occur. Ok, debate within scientific research areas is expected. Yet, major news 
networks from National Public Radio to the BBC have discussed it. Additionally, peer reviewed articles 
have explored it. 
The final strategic surprise component to consider is simply….is this scenario hard to imagine? 
Hmmm, lets look at history and a similar type event – Hurricane Katrina. Even armed with the 
information/results, nearly one year to the date, from a Table Top entitled “Hurricane Pam” key planners 
still did not believe that a Hurricane Katrina like event could occur especially with the associated HA/DR 
response. Isolated case? You be the judge if a La Palma type event is possible….and how the maritime 
forces of the United States would approach their response. 
To begin to craft a response I want to go old school and consider joint doctrine. JP 3-29 (Foreign 
Humanitarian Assistance) published on 3 January 2014. Joint Pub 3-29 does a perfect job of describing 
the role played, “Because Department of Defense (DOD) will normally be in a supporting role during 
FHA contingency operations, the joint force commander (JFC) may not be responsible for determining 
the mission or specifying the participating agencies. Appropriate organization, command and control 
(C2), and, most important, an understanding of the objectives of the organizations involved are all means 
to build consensus and achieve unity of effort.” 
                                                 
5 BBC (2000) Mega-tsunami: Wave of Destruction. http://www.bbc.co.uk/science/horizon/2000/mega_tsunami_transcript.shtml 
6 Peter Schwartz and Doug Randall, (2007)  “Ahead of the Curve: Anticipating Strategic Surprise,” in Francis Fukuyama, ed., 
Blindside: How To Anticipate Forcing Events and Wild Cards In Global Politics (Baltimore: Brookings Institute Press, 93–108. 
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The unity of effort piece is key….but this has to extend well beyond the tactical level response. The real 
value is to look at the lessons learned from multiple events (such as Haiti from an urban perspective) and re-
craft doctrine, campaign plans and standing “quick response cards” in the tenants of strategic surprise and 
then using modeling and simulation to “game out” scenarios to refine the products you have, developed. 
As part of the development process, as products such as doctrine are revised leadership needs to 
ensure every effort is undertaken to reduce the group-think. How do you do that….by ensuring an “Arch 
Protagonist” is appointed to inject “disruptive think”. This approach is invaluable in strategic doctrine 
development where the norm is established. 
The final area that needs to be re-enforced is leverage every opportunity before an HA/DR event to 
get to know your partners – especially the agencies like USAID that coordinate aid and the Non-
Government agencies. Notes JP 3-29: 
 
Increasingly, the resources of the international business community are being utilized to 
mitigate human suffering associated with disasters. Businesses donate talent or in-kind 
goods and services to disaster relief and recovery operations in developing countries and 
wish to ensure that their help is delivered in a coordinated and effective manner. The 
same is true for foreign disaster response. Many large private-sector companies maintain 
disaster/crisis response teams that can respond and add value to USG operations by 
providing infrastructure and other supporting services. DOD mechanisms that plan for, 
train, and implement emergency responses to disasters should consider the private 
sector. This should be done through USAID OFDA, which maintains communication with 
UN agencies and other international organizations and private sector donors to ensure 
the USG complements rather than duplicates existing assistance programs. In addition to 
large transnational corporations, the private sector also includes the local, national, and 
other companies and organizations which should be considered and engaged through the 
country team, USAID, or other existing USG channels.
7
 
 
In conclusion, the world is changing. Our climate is indeed changing….its’ “vital signs” highlight 
projected changes in sea level height and storm significance. Couple this with the destructive power of the 
La Palma volcano and the need for a well developed and trained HA/DR effort that can scale up and 
down, and work across both interagency but also internationally – with governments and NGOs alike. 
How can the Maritime Forces of the United States be ready for this type of issue…simply…look at what 
science is saying what the art of the possible --- what scenarios would create a possible HA/DR 
event..especially in an urban event…then use a strategic surprise framework to prepare for it. Understand 
who your partners are, what the hurdles are, what the authorities are upfront will make the response much 
easier to coordinate. This isn’t anything new in HA/DR….but what is new is the partners involved…what 
if China or Russia rush a response to scene…are your plans flexible enough to work with them? 
One final recommendation….after your strategy, doctrine and plans are revised to considered the 
unexpected….set up a group to critically review them….using disruptive thinking…look for the gaps by 
asking the what if questions. By doing so your overall response will be more resilient, and better prepared 
to handle a La Palma event. Strategic Surprise is coming and HA/DR planners looking at an urban 
environment need to embrace it – know your partners and think disruptively. 
                                                 
7 Joint Publication (JP 3-29) (2014, January 3) Foreign Humanitarian Assistance. 
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_29.pdf 
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PANEL 6: HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND DISASTER RELIEF 
IMPROVING CIVIL-MILITARY COORDINATION AND PROTECTING AID WORKERS 
 
Ms. Julia Brooks 
Harvard Humanitarian Initiative 
 
A number of important developments and trends are forcing us to rethink humanitarian response in 
general, and civil-military engagement in particular. These include: the increased frequency and impact of 
natural disasters and complex emergencies, exacerbated by the effects of climate change; rapid 
urbanization and population growth, and with it, urban poverty, violence and instability;
1
 and the increased 
involvement of international militaries in responding to these crises, alongside humanitarian actors.
 
To this list of trends, I’d like to add several more concerning ones: First, while large-scale killing in 
violent conflicts is decreasing, volatility and low-intensity conflicts are increasing.
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 Second, forced 
displacement is at record levels, with over 60 million people currently displaced around the globe, the 
majority of whom, 38 million, are not refugees but rather internally displaced.
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 If the population of forcibly 
displaced were a country, it would reportedly be the world’s 24
th
 largest.
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 Displacement is also contributing 
to urbanization in two ways: first, the majority of the world’s refugees and displaced persons now end up in 
cities and towns, not refugee camps;
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 and second, as people remain longer in displacement, some of 
today’s largest refugee camps – such as Dadaab camp in Kenya or Zaatari camp in Jordan – are likely to 
become tomorrow’s cities.
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The third trend is growing disrespect for international law and humanitarian norms, and with it, a 
staggering increase – nearly four-fold – in the number of violent attacks against humanitarian aid workers 
over the last decade.
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 In many of the world’s conflict zones – especially Afghanistan, Syria, South Sudan, 
Central African Republic and Pakistan – the Red Cross or blue shield, once designed to distinguish and 
protect humanitarians from attack, is increasingly becoming a bull’s-eye. The urban dynamic is also 
important here, since discrimination in targeting becomes even more difficult in complex emergencies in 
big cities, given the density of population and complexity of actors. While some of these attacks against aid 
workers occur as a result of indiscriminate or mistaken targeting, the majority appear to be deliberate.
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Moreover, we know all too well that threats and attacks on humanitarian aid workers do not only 
emanate from non-state armed groups. Following the U.S. airstrike on its trauma center in Kunduz, 
Afghanistan on October 3
rd
 of last year, for example, MSF facilities were hit by Saudi-led coalition 
airstrikes in Yemen on October 26
th
 and December 2
rd
, and by airstrikes in Syria on November 21
st
 and 
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 And MSF is by no means the only organization to suffer from the recent incidents of violence against 
aid workers and facilities. As a result, some such aid organizations now consider conventional armed forces 
to pose a greater threat to the security of their staff than insurgent groups certain environments. 
And while devastating in their own right, attacks against aid workers have had even more devastating 
consequences for the populations they serve, curtailing access and depriving vulnerable populations of life-
saving assistance. The result is a critical challenge for civil-military coordination and the humanitarian 
sector: How to provide the best assistance possible to populations in need, marshaling all the resources at 
our disposal – both humanitarian and military – to respond to crises? How to create a “new model of civil-
military humanitarian coordination”, as many have appropriately called for, without jeopardizing the 
essential neutral, impartial, independent, and ultimately, humanitarian nature of emergency response, and 
with it, secure access for aid workers? 
Many have already called for increased education and training, and these are critical. Military and 
humanitarian communities must get to know each other better, and participation in joint trainings and 
simulations is a great start. There is also a need for better means of communication and information sharing 
to ensure that this dialogue continues during operations, when it is needed most.
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 And more research is 
clearly needed to inform policy making, as much of it remains anecdotal or experiential today. 
But militaries must also know when not to engage in humanitarian response. This also requires research, 
training and informed policy-making. We need to be wary of the militarization of humanitarian aid, as much 
as the humanitarianization of military operations. We need to recognize when the needs of vulnerable 
populations and affected communities are best served by civil-military cooperation, such as in certain large-
scale natural disasters, and when they are best served by a clear separation between military and 
humanitarian action, such as in many conflicts and complex emergencies. This is important not just in terms 
of joint operations, where militaries engage alongside humanitarian actors. We must also question situations 
where militaries provide aid on their own, especially in the course of counterinsurgency or “hearts and 
minds” campaigns. Humanitarian agencies have frequently cited such operations as contributing to 
perceptions of them as legitimate targets of attack in countries like Afghanistan, now among the deadliest 
for aid workers.
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Improving civil-military coordination calls for us to work better together, and there are many 
circumstances in which that can make a real difference. Yet especially in conflicts and complex 
emergencies, protecting aid workers also calls for us to learn to work better apart. In some cases, this is 
because military involvement in humanitarian operations may pose an inherent risk to aid workers and 
beneficiary populations, especially when militaries are also belligerents in a conflict. In other cases, this is 
because experience demonstrates that both parties have not yet learned to work together effectively, and 
disregard for the implications of their actions are putting aid worker and civilian lives at risk. 
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